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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
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·----;P.M. 'j ~ °¼ -
AUG O 9 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KRISTI DUMON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK ANTHONY BLACK, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2015-13589 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF SENTENCE 
On April 8, 2016, Mark Black received a fifteen-year prison sentence, ten years of which 
is fixed time, for trafficking in heroin in violation ofl.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6). Ten years of fixed 
time is the mandatory minimum sentence set by the Idaho legislature for the offense. A 
judgment of conviction was entered on April 11, 2016. Black did not appeal. 
Black did, however, file a motion under I.C.R. 35(b), asking the Court to reduce his 
sentence as a matter ofleniency. He filed that motion on May 12, 2016. Although the motion is 
silent on the point, it seemingly was addressed, when filed, to the indeterminate portion of the 
sentence, given that the fixed portion is, as already noted, the minimum the law requires. In any 
event, the motion was unsupported, but it was accompanied by a request for permission to later 
supplement it with supporting evidence or documentation. On May 24, 2016, the Court issued 
an order setting a supplementation deadline of August 8, 2016. 
Before the supplementation deadline arrived, Black changed counsel. 
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On August 2, 2016, through new counsel, Black filed a motion under I.C.R. 33(c) to 
withdraw his guilty plea, as well as an affidavit of counsel with several attachments and a 
memorandum supporting both the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and the previously filed 
Rule 35 motion. In those papers, Black contends the Idaho legislature's requirement for a ten 
year mandatory minimum prison sentence is, on various grounds, unconstitutional, entitling him 
to withdraw his guilty plea or, at a minimum, to be resentenced as ifthere were no mandatory 
minimum. He asks for a hearing on these two motions, saying he wants an opportunity to 
present evidence but not describing the evidence he would present if given the opportunity. In 
an exercise of its discretion, the Court declines to set a hearing, as in the Court's judgment a 
hearing would not be helpful to deciding the motions. 
Starting with Black's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the Court notes that Black had 
forty-two days after the judgment of conviction was entered to appeal from it. I.AR. 14(a). 
Given the judgment of conviction's entry on April 11, 2016, the forty-two day appeal period 
expired on May 23, 2016. 1 Black did not appeal. When the appeal period expired without an 
appeal, the Court was, as a general matter, divested of jurisdiction over the case and, in 
particular, lacks jurisdiction to consider Black's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See, e.g., 
State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352,355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003) ("Rule 33(c) of the Idaho Criminal 
Rules does not include any provision extending the jurisdiction of the trial court for the purpose 
of hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Jakoski was sentenced on December 12, 1994, 
and the judgment was entered on December 22, 1994. He did not appeal the judgment, and it 
therefore became final 42 days later. Thereafter. the district court no longer had jurisdiction to 
1 Black's Rule 35 motion did not extend the appeal period. It was filed on May 12, 2016, which 
is thirty-one days after the judgment of conviction was enter~d. A Rule 35 mo~io~ e~tends the 
appeal period only if it is filed within fourteen days after the Judgment of conv1ct1on 1s entered. 
I.A.R. 14(a); State v. Alberts, 124 Idaho 489,490 n. 1,861 P.2d 59, 60 n.1 (1993). 
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hear a motion to withdraw Jakoski's guilty plea.") (footnote omitted). That motion therefore 
must be denied. 
The jurisdictional bar, however, does not cover Black's Rule 35 motion to any extent it 
seeks relief that is available under that rule. Rule 35 is a grant of jurisdiction to award the relief 
for which it provides, and to do so within the timeframes it specifies. 
Turning to that motion, the Court notes that, to the extent relief is sought under Rule 
35(b), the motion is a plea for leniency, addressed to the Court's discretion. See State v. 
Knighton, 143 Idaho 318,319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845,846, 771 
P .2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). To be entitled to a reduced sentence under Rule 35(b ), Black must 
show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information provided in support 
of the motion. See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). The fixed 
portion of Black's sentence, again, is the mandatory minimum sentence required by law for his 
offense. That portion of the sentence therefore cannot be reduced as a matter of leniency. The 
Court has authority to reduce the indeterminate portion of Black's sentence as a matter of 
leniency, but, after considering the materials Black presented and the rest of the record, the Court 
will not do so because it does not regard that portion of the sentence as excessive. 
To the extent Black seeks relief under Rule 35(a) on the theory that his sentence is illegal 
because the statutory requirement for a ten year mandatory minimum prison sentence is 
unconstitutional (on any of several grounds), the Court is not persuaded that Rule 35(a)'s grant 
of jurisdiction is broad enough to encompass awarding relief on that theory. Rule 35(a) 
authorizes relief from an illegal sentence only if the sentence's illegality is apparent from the 
face of the record and can be discerned without resolving significant factual questions or holding 
an evidentiary hearing. E.g., State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65,343 P.3d 497,607 (2015). Thus, 
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Rule 35(a) motions "must involve only questions oflaw." Id Black's basic contention is that he 
is a drug abuser, not a drug dealer (at least not on a large scale), and that the ten year mandatory 
minimum sentence is unreasonably harsh in light of his criminal behavior. That basic contention 
is the thrust of several different constitutional arguments. None of these arguments could 
possibly be resolved in Black's favor without making significant factual findings. Some of the 
arguments would necessitate factual findings as to the extent to which he was involved in selling 
drugs rather than simply using them. Another argument-that the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection of the law is violated by the legislative provisions punishing heroin trafficking 
more severely than cocaine trafficking-necessitates factual findings about the respective social 
ills and other consequences of heroin use and cocaine use. The fact-intensive nature of the 
analysis Black is asking the Court to undertake is not lost on him-he requests an evidentiary 
hearing. (Mem. Supp. Rule 33(c) and Rule 35 Mots. 16.) The unconstitutionality of Black's 
mandatory minimum sentence simply is not apparent from the face of the record. Instead, any 
constitutional defect could be ascertained only by resolving significant factual questions. 
Black's constitutional arguments therefore cannot be litigated under Rule 35(a). 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Black's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Black's motion for reconsideration of sentence is 
denied. 
~"' Dated this~ day of August, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
,h 
I hereby certify that on this j_ day of August, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
VIA interdepartmental mail 
John C. Lynn 
Attorney at Law 
6661 Glenwood St. 
Boise, ID 83714 
VIA EMAIL: john@johnlynnlaw.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MARK BLACK, )
)
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-________
v. )
) PETITION FOR




COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, JOHN C. LYNN,
and hereby files this PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (“Petition”).
1. Petitioner is currently detained in the custody of the Idaho State Correctional
Institution (“ISCC”) in Boise, Idaho, and under the control and jurisdiction of the Idaho
Department of Corrections.
2. The Judgment in issue was imposed by the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State
of Idaho, Ada County.




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
CV01-17-05039
Clerk, District CourtJudge Jason Scott
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4. Petitioner was convicted of trafficking in heroin pursuant to Idaho Code §37-
2732(B)(a)(6)(B) and received fifteen year prison term, ten years of which is fixed by the above
statute.
5. Petitioner was found guilty by a plea of guilty and a conviction was entered on April
11, 2016.
6. Petitioner did not appeal the conviction; however, Petitioner filed motions to withdraw
his plea and/or reduce sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c) and 35(b), respectively, which were
denied by Order entered on August 9, 2016.
7. Petitioner has not previously filed a petitioner for post-conviction relief.
8. This Petition is based on the court file and proceedings in Case No. CR-FE-2015-
13589, including the presentence report1, the Declarations of John C. Lynn, John Casper, MD,
Faith Sawyer MS, LPC and Mark Gornik, MS, filed herewith.
9. The ground upon which this application is that the Trafficking statute in issue2, Idaho
Code §37-2732B(a)(6)(B), upon which the Petitioner was convicted, is unconstitutional, for the
following reasons:
a. A fixed sentence of ten years based on a finding of guilt for the mere
possession of more than seven grams of heroin is arbitrary and without any rational basis to
support the inference that Petitioner was a drug trafficker, as contemplated by the STATEMENT
OF PURPOSE behind the statute. As set for the in the STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, the statute
was designed to target “high asset”, heavily involved drug traffickers (see Exhibit C, Declaration
of John C. Lynn). Petitioner suffered from a serious heroin addiction problem, a mental and
physical illness, at the time of his arrest. He had no assets and demonstrated no violence toward
1 The presentence report was ordered released to Petitioner forensic experts by Order entered 11/22/16.
2 The general Trafficking statute referenced in this Petition is Idaho Code § 37-2732B.
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the arresting officers. Thus, the statute punishes a person for having a mental and physical
illness in violation of due process of law under Art I Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and
the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
b. The general Trafficking statute, Idaho Code §37-2732(B), punishes a person
for trafficking in illegal drugs, yet fails to require the State to prove any indicia of trafficking, or
selling of drugs for profit, such as possession with intent to deliver, delivery itself or the
manufacturing of illegal drugs. The statutes creates a conclusive, irrefutable presumption that
mere possession itself constitutes the odious crime of drug trafficking, and all that the term
implies. Thus, the statute violates the due process of law provisions cited above.
c. The general Trafficking statute eliminates the requirement that there must exist
a union between an act and intent in order for the act to be a criminal offense, as required by
Idaho Code §18-114. The Petitioner’s addiction was at such a level that he had no control over
the possession and use of the addicted substance involved – heroin. Thus, the statute violates the
due process of law provisions cited above.
d. The general Trafficking statute fails to define the term “trafficking” and fails to
require any level of purity, and in fact, allows the State to prosecute a person for trafficking by
the mere possession of “any detectable amount”. An addict, such as Petitioner, could be
prosecuted for having the requisite statutory amount of substance if such substance contained a
mere trace of heroin. It defies logic to infer that persons in possession of this quantity of
substance are drug traffickers, even assuming the term was defined. Thus, again, the statute
suffers from vagueness and irrationality in violation of the due process provisions cited above.
e. The general Trafficking statute creates different classes of drug traffickers
without any rational basis for treating these differing classes differently. For example,
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possession of between seven and 28 grams of heroin results in a fixed ten year sentence.
Possession of the same amount of cocaine results in no fixed sentence (Idaho Code §37-
2732B(a)(2)(A)); likewise, possession of the same amount of methamphetamine results in no
fixed sentence (Idaho Code §37-2732B(a)(4)(A)). One must possess at least 28 grams of cocaine
or methamphetamine to fall within any fixed sentence which would be three years if the amount
was less than 200 grams. A drug trafficker possessing more than one pound but less than five
pounds of marijuana would face a fixed sentence of just one year (Idaho Code §37-
2732B(a)(1)(A), and thus, the general Trafficking statute is arbitrary and unfair in violation of
‘equal protection’ under Art 1 Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
f. The general Trafficking statute, together with Idaho Code §37-3101, et seq, as
they apply to drug addicts, also creates two classes of persons. Those persons who are
prosecuted under the general Trafficking statute are treated as criminals and suffer significant
incarceration. Those addicts who voluntarily commit themselves to treatment under the
provisions of Idaho Code §37-3101, et seq, are treated as persons with mental and physical
illnesses, rather than as criminals, whose admissions as to drug use and possession are protected
from disclosure. The first class of persons receives no treatment; however, the second class
receives treatment for their addictions. There is no rational basis justifying this distinction and
disparate treatment of these two classes of persons, and thus the general Trafficking statute is
arbitrary and unfair, in violation of “equal protection” under the equal protection provisions cited
above.
g. The general Trafficking statute, together with Idaho Code §19-2524, as it
applies to drug addicts, also creates two classes of persons. Those persons who are prosecuted
000013
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under the Trafficking statute suffer significant incarceration without the evaluation and treatment
options available to the Court pursuant to Idaho Code §19-2423 and 2424. Those addicts who
are not prosecuted under the general Trafficking statute are treated as persons with a substance
abuse disorder and/or mental illness and are eligible for court-ordered substance abuse treatment.
The first class of persons receives no treatment; however, the second class receives treatment for
addiction and attendant mental disorders. There is no rational basis justifying this distinction and
disparate treatment of these two classes of persons, and thus the statute is arbitrary and unfair in
violation of “equal protection” under the equal protection provisions cited above.
h. The Trafficking statute in issue (Idaho Code §37-2732B(a)(6)(B), mandates a
fixed sentence which is disproportionate to the crime. A fixed ten year sentence for mere
possession of more than seven but less than 28 grams of heroin is grossly out of proportion to
the gravity of the act committed (addiction), in comparison to other criminal sentencing laws in
Idaho and throughout the United States. This disproportionality shocks the public conscience in
violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of Art 1 Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution
and the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
i. The general Trafficking statute in issue deprives the Court of its inherent power
and discretion in criminal cases where addiction, and its attendant physical and mental illness,
are excluded from consideration, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine under Art 5
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
10. A further ground upon which this Petition is based is that trial counsel’s performance
was deficient and caused prejudice to Petitioner as follows:
000014
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a. Trial counsel failed to raise a motion to dismiss the trial proceedings on the
grounds that Idaho Code §37-2732B(a)(6)(B) is unconstitutional for the reasons set forth
above;
b. Trial counsel’s failure fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;
c. There is a reasonable probability that, had trial counsel filed said motion to
dismiss, the trial proceedings would have been dismissed.
d. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation Art 1 Section
13 of the Idaho Constitution, and the 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that the Court order the Respondent to file an answer
to the Petition herein;
FURTHER, Petitioner requests that this Court vacate the underlying conviction and/or
sentence herein;
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, Petitioner requests that this Court set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing and attendant discovery to fully resolve any factual disputes.
DATED This 21st day of March, 2017.
/s/ John C. Lynn
JOHN C .LYNN
Attorney for Petitioner
I, John C. Lynn, hereby declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State
of Idaho that the forgoing is true and correct.
DATED This 21st day of March, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of March, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICOURT system, which sent a Notice of
Electronic Filing to the following to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney at:
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
DATED This 21st day of March, 2017.
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IN TH DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT





) DECLARATION OF MARK GORNIK, MS
vs. )
)
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Defendant )
I, MARK GORNIK, MS, depose and state as follows:
1. I am 65 years old, competent to provide this declaration herein and have been retained by
Plaintiff’s counsel to render expert opinions in the above matter based on my education and
experience; my resume is attached.
2. In 1994 I received an Interdisciplinary Masters of Science degree “Counseling and
administration in Criminal Justice “from Boise State University.
3. I currently own and operate Correctional Therapeutic Services (CTS) a consulting, training
and quality assurance LLC. CTS provides technical assistance on a variety of Criminal
Justice Topics related to offender change programs, systems approaches to design,
implementation and evaluation of evidence based offender change programs, substance
abuse treatment, clinical supervision in the criminal justice system, correctional leadership
Electronically Filed
3/21/2017 10:47:16 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
CV01-17-05039
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Development and systems approaches to justice agency strategic planning. I have presented
explanations, interpretation of current Justice research and guided agency planning regarding
the use of that research to design treatment programs, developing sentencing guidelines, and
as a rationale for treatment/sanction matching. I assisted Idaho as well as other state and
federal agencies in the creation of drug courts programs and justice policy reform. I have
presented at a variety of conferences and seminars in relation to best practices in the criminal
justice system and understanding criminality 4. I was employed by the State of Idaho as
Program Manager at The Idaho State Correctional Institution and later as The Administrator
of Programs for the Idaho Department of Correction. Prior to going into private practice I
served for two years as the Correctional Program Specialist for the National Institute of
Corrections (NIC) Community Corrections Division in Washington D.C.
5. For purposes of my involvement in this case, I have personally interviewed Mark Black
twice at the Idaho State Correctional Center, conducted a Level of Service Inventory –
Revised (“LSR-I”) reviewed his previous treatment records and I have been granted access to
and have reviewed the Presentence Investigation (“PSI”) prepared for his sentencing on April
8, 2016.
6. Prior to my professional experience I was personally involved in illegal drug activity
including almost 20 years of drug use from recreational experimentation, beginning at age
13, to a diagnosis of pathological drug addiction with a poor prognosis for recovery. My
drugs of choice (DOC) were opiates and amphetamine. The outcome of my long term
involvement with drugs included but was not limited to, early onset of neuropathy and
hepatic failure, use and distribution of most illicit drugs and estrangement from family.
Legally my drug use resulted in 5 felony arrests, 3 convictions, numerous trips to jails and
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prisons, severe impact to my physical health and other long term use complications including
multiple drug use related job losses. I had, as is the case with most severe drug abusers,
attempted countless times to quit including four (4) treatment episodes (outpatient, inpatient
and long term intensive inpatient). Most of my personal attempts to live drug free, as well as,
the several attempts at treatment ended in relapse after very short periods of abstinence.
Treatment was finally successful in 1983 when I began my successful rehabilitation with the
completion of a court mandated long term intensive inpatient program as an alternative to
incarceration.
7. With the aforementioned qualifications in mind I want to make some general observations
about the statute in issue – Idaho Code §37-2732(B). The unclear nature of the statute
components makes application of it arbitrary. It was the arbitrary nature of some
indeterminate sentencing that fixed mandatory sentencing was created to correct. However
the law appears to have just taken the decision making power away from the judge and
placed it with the police and prosecutor. Examples of the statute’s lack of clarity are as
follows:
a. Lack of or inaccurate definition of “trafficking”. This law is not supported by current
definitions of trafficking used in today’s state and national laws. For example, drug
trafficking includes trafficking, sales, distribution, manufacturing, and smuggling of
controlled substances. It does not include simple possession of controlled substances (see
LIST OF AUTHORITIES attached, #15 and # 17).
b. The criteria for what constitutes trafficking in this statute are not inconsistent by
definition but limited and insufficient in regard to the burden of proof. The only criteria
are the quantity in the possession of the defendant at the time of arrest. This criteria
000019
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completely ignores any other indicia of trafficking such as selling, intending Using
possession as the only criteria for trafficking is arbitrary and in fact, as stated above, is
contrary to commonly used criminal Justice definitions used to differentiate possession
from trafficking or drug dealing (Id).
c. The inference that a certain threshold quantity of a drug can determine possession for
the purpose of sales versus possession for personal use is not supported by research or by
many hundreds of case studies of people on the streets that use. Factors that support the
truth of this argument and make it virtually impossible to say that two packages of the
same weight are in any way comparable in quality or sale value including large variations
in the quality, abuse potential, and potency, the stated weight versus the actual weight at
the time of use or sale, and the presence of other chemicals (both mood and non-mood
altering). Whereas 26 grams in one package may contain 15 grams of the illegal
substance whereas the next 26 gram package may contain only 5 grams of the illegal
substance. Therefore an addict may have to use the entire second package for personal
use/need in a week’s time and be able to sell two thirds of the first package. It is also not
unusual for a street addict to use or dispose (see disposition of street drugs) of over 26
grams in a week to feed a moderate to severe addiction. Others factors related to the
actual or intended disposition of a given amount of a controlled substance in possession
difficult to determine are; some of the drug may be lost or stolen, some is traded for
property other than money, some is given out on credit and never paid for. All of these
factors make quantity alone a poor indicator of whether the drug was sold for monetary
gain or possessed for personal use. In fact there is no evidence to support the view that
quantity in possession alone is indicative of intent to sell vs. personal use. Profiles and
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interviews of incarcerated men and women indicate that the majority of them fall into this
category of a user who sells to support an out of control habit. They are by no means
“asset rich” as is the case with Mark Black.
d. The statute fails to take into consideration the brain chemistry of heroin drug addicts.
We need to counter the idea that drug use, after a certain point, is volitional – it is a
compelling need that transcends even self-preservation. The deterioration of one’s
decision making ability, problem identification, and deteriorating hygiene keeps pace
with increasingly sloppy and mistake ridden disposition and sale of drugs accompanied
by the onset of pathological deterioration of brain chemistry and brain function. This
deteriorating, unkempt; out of control behavior is not in any way consistent with the
behavior of a true asset rich drug trafficker. Behaviors such as passing out in one's car
slumped over the steering wheel with illicit drugs in your possession.
e. The quantity possessed under the statute (2, 7, 28 grams) used as the criteria for length
of a fixed sentence increases is also arbitrary and decades behind research. It is also
inconsistent with my experience with thousands of convicted drug offenders. When
considering all the variables that come into play when examining the daily behavior of a
street addict with a moderate to severe habit it should be clear at this point that there are
no empirical or rational arguments that would justify such a dramatic increase in fixed
incarceration based on the /quantity of the substance.
8. Based on my life experience, particularly my involvement in the illegal drug trade, I
became familiar with the habits and characteristics of both drug addicts and street dealers, as
well as, what is now called drug traffickers. In that light, I make the following personal and
professional observations:
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a. In the past because of the stigma and negative public opinion attached to people
with drug problems very few addicts were willing to come forward and offer a picture of
the drug culture from the user’s perspective. I found this unfortunate since certainly an
individual that lives the harsh and seemingly hopeless lifestyle of someone trapped by the
malady can offer the most realistic picture of what really happens day to day. There are a
variety of reasons accurate information about what goes on and who’s who in the drug
world rarely makes it to the public ear. The illegality of drug possession and/or sales, fear
of reprisal from other users, and pressure from family are just a few of those reasons.
b. In Mr. Black’s case it seemed evident from a review of the police report and PSI
that the determination that Mr. Black was a trafficker prior his interrogation was based
solely on the amount of drug seized in the arrest and the opinion of the arresting officers.
Having myself been deeply embedded in the drug culture I can testify that when legal
guidelines are followed, it may take months or even years of methodical investigation to
determine who is actually trafficking the drug, who is an addicted user supporting a habit
and who is a user still new enough to the progression of the disease they haven’t crossed
the line or become compelled to do illegal activities to obtain their drug of choice. Mr.
Black was, at arrest and prior thereto, an addicted user only.
c. According to the Statement of Purpose supporting the the mandatory minimum
sentencing statute (see Lynn Decl.t) the fixed sentences therein targeted “high profile”,
and “asset rich” drug traffickers although no definition of such a target is set forth in the
statute. Short of a long and methodical investigation and/or insider information it is
nearly impossible to determine who the front line traffickers are. The designation that a
person is a drug trafficker, under this statute, is determined solely by the possession of an
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arbitrary quantity of substance at the time of arrest. This is not a very humane or
enlightened way to decide the outcome of a person’s life for the next ten years.
d. In trying to paint an accurate picture of Mr. Black in this case, I reviewed the
police report, the PSI, documents written by clinical staff from Mr. Black’s past attempts
at treatment. In addition to the various documents I personally administered an LSI-R and
conducted two interviews with Mr. Black at the prison. To make sense of the allegation
that Mr. Black was trafficking I looked first at the quantity of drug in possession the one
and only criteria that the law does spell out as a qualifier. So one has to ask does it mean
3 grams of cutter 5 grams of the illegal substance or does it mean actually 3 grams of the
illegal substance. In this case it didn’t appear to matter in deciding if it qualified for
trafficking but it sure matters to the buyer and the seller. For example a person (as I have
done or witnessed countless times) may turn 1 gram of powder into three using cutter in 5
minutes before arriving at the point of sale. Which one qualifies me as a trafficker the cut
package or the pure package. If I were the recipient of the three grams made out of one
it’s not unrealistic to assume that if it’s the pure drug I’m dependent on the entire three
grams might be one day’s personal use. Looking then at a weeks’ time period, it is also
plausible that an addict may have never sold drugs but still be in possession of 21 grams
of the cut product. It is simply their personal use for that week. This is particularly true if
that person has developed their habit using the more pure form.
e. Another argument often made to suggest quantity makes a case for intent to sell is
the packaging of the drug into specific amounts. However, it is not unusual for an addict
(myself included when I was using) to package what is going to be used into daily doses.
Much like a person not involved in illegal drug use might do when carrying prescribed
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medication in a container labeled Monday, Tuesday Wednesday, etc. From years of
experience and interactions with many hundreds of users I can say users that fit Mr.
Blacks profile rarely know exactly what they’re getting in terms of t drug purity from one
buy to the next. On the other hand a for profit trafficker depends on knowing exactly
what they have, how pure it is and how many times it can be cut etc. Their profit margin
depends on it. So does Mr. Black fit the profile of the typical trafficker? No not if one
goes strictly by amount in possession. I have known people myself included that could
easily call 15 grams less than one week’s supply for personal use. If I’m Mr. Black
maybe I sell some maybe I don’t but profit is not the main agenda for a Mr. Black.
f. There are several other factors in Mr. Black’s case which negate the determination
that he was a drug trafficker. One way is to know and compare behaviors and attributes
common to drug traffickers, none of which were present in Mr. Black’s case. For
example, drug traffickers are not interested in the drug other than for a monetary gain and
are not likely to use the drug particularly when conducting business. It is definitely not
likely that a trafficker would be high on the product to be sold. So high that they passed
out in strange place slumped over their steering wheel as was Mr. Black on the day of his
arrest. Another aspect of a drug traffickers profile would be a desire to be invisible to all
but a select few customers and then only in private and in full control of their faculties. In
contrast, Mr. Black was known, by his own admission, to be involved with a fairly large
group of users and didn’t seem to care to much what state of mind he was in even when
driving around; this is not a very good practice if one intends to traffic for very long.
Then there is the demeanor of the true drug trafficker during police interrogation. Drug
traffickers would not talk or be cooperative with the police without counsel and certainly
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would not accept a plea barging in the first few hours of the arrest as Mr. Black did. It is
my experience that most seasoned police officers know this. A person doesn’t have to be
involved in the drug culture to see that Mr. Black’s behavior the night of his arrest was
not indicative of a trafficker. In fact was no proof that Mr. Black was anything more than
a heavy user and maybe not a very smart one at that.
9. With respect to treatment, I have seen case after case where the difference between an
opportunity to participate in treatment followed by educated supervision have led to successful
outcomes where as another case ends like Mr. Black with no assessment, no treatment, and a
long period of incarceration. All the current research indicates that incarceration alone for drug
dependent offends makes them worse by seven percent (see LIST OF AUTHORITIES #1 and
#2).
10. So to summarize I would like to make these two points 1) there was no burden under this
law to prove M. Black was a trafficker and there is no reliable evidence to say he was. 2) This
law has from my own experience has allowed people to be label people as traffickers who I knew
in fact were not. In many cases those same people plead guilty to trafficking out of fear of larger
consequences presented to them during an interrogation particularly those done without counsel.
They took a plea bargain rather than stick to the truth.
12. The disparate treatment between heroin possession and cocaine/methamphetamine
possession under the statutes is also arbitrary with no factual justification. For example, Idaho
Code § 37-2732(B) (a) (2) (A) provides for a fixed sentence of 3 years for possession of cocaine
in the amount of 28 to 200 grams. This is the same fixed treatment for meth (Idaho Code §. 37-
2732(B) (a) (3) (A)). This disparity in type and quantity of a drug versus length of sentence is
another aspect of the fixed sentencing laws that make it unscientific, unfounded and arbitrary.
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There is no valid reasoning or scientific proof that one drug is more dangerous than another
unless one specifically defines the meaning of dangerousness and harm. In addition there are far
too many variables associated with the degree of dangerousness or harm to the public to
scientifically and consistently say one drug and quantity of that drug are more harmful than
another. Some but not all of the variables are; current public opinion, availability of drugs vs.
societal impact, disenfranchisement and cultural disparity in sentencing, the typical behavior of
users when high (e.g. a heroin addict is fairly inactive stays home and enjoys “nod out”
committing crimes only when in need of a new supply whereas a meth addict will be active for
days on end, often suffering from sleep deprived psychosis, and commits crimes simply for the
excitement or the sake of it), high profile cases, media exposure, the character and personality of
the user and the effect the drug has individual to individual.
13. The actual treatment options in the incarceration setting compared to treatment
options in a non-incarceration setting vary in availability, quality, appropriateness, and likelihood
of referral to treatment making chances of success far lower for incarcerated individuals than
those seeking treatment in a non-incarcerated scenario. Currently programs that would benefit
Mr. Black source prior treatment history and assessments are not available in the Idaho
correctional system. Appropriate treatment programs for sentenced offenders in Idaho are
typically available at the back end of their sentence. Experience and research would bear out
that this is long periods of incarceration alone leave offenders worse, more entrenched in
criminal attitudes beliefs and behaviors, and therefore more resistant to treatment and good
outcomes when they finally receive it. The evidence is that incarceration of addicts like Mark for
long periods of time (10-12 years) is counterproductive (see LIST OF AUTHORITIES #2, #3
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and #5). Long untreated periods of incarceration is also counter to society’s interest in addressing
this problem in a cost effective manner. (see LIST OF AUTHORITIES #1,#2,#3,#6,#10).
14. After four decades of soaring prison growth and stubbornly high recidivism rates, the
United States is rethinking its heavy reliance on incarceration. Individual states, recognizing that
the fiscal and human costs of widespread imprisonment largely outweigh its public safety
benefits, are leading this shift. Many state leaders are embracing a fresh approach to corrections
guided by data and anchored in evidence about what truly works to change criminal behavior.
Tough-on-crime rhetoric is being eclipsed by calls for a more data-driven criminal justice system
that delivers increased public safety at a lower cost (see LIST OF AUTHORITIES #18 and #19).
The Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) is a response to these calls and has been a strong
catalyst for state reform. A public-private partnership between the Bureau of Justice Assistance
(BJA) and The Pew Charitable Trusts (Pew), JRI was formally launched in 2010 to help states
fully understand their unique correctional trends and adopt policies and practices to better
manage their corrections populations (see the Justice Reinvestment Initiative State Assessment
Report released in January 2014 that summarizes what has happened in the 28 states that
engaged in the JRI process between 2010 and 2016.
15. A review of state efforts shows that 2015 prison populations in more than half the JRI
states were below previously projected levels (see the Justice Reinvestment Initiative State
Assessment Report). The JRI strategies helped 15 states either decrease their prison populations
or keep them below levels they were predicted to reach without reform. This is consistent with
all of the literature I reviewed the Meta analysis and predictive articles as well as my 30 years of
experience. On the fiscal front, through 2016, JRI states reported a total of $1.1 billion in savings
or averted costs attributable to reforms (see the Justice Reinvestment Initiative State Assessment
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Report) (see LIST OF AUTHORITIES #15 and #17). Outcomes and others are even in the early
stages significant. So with the new and encouraging results being realized across the country by
both state and federal government the literature allows for a look at individual case studies and
specific law in need of reform to come to harmony with the research and the rest of the
country.15 While Idaho certainly would not come in last in an examination of how Idaho’s
efforts and progress measure up nationally (see LIST OF AUTHORITIES #18), however, any
recognition of progress is overshadowed by fixed sentence statutes like the one in question in
this case. These laws are arbitrary and without a factual foundation in many respects (see LIST
OF AUTHORITIES #15 and #17).
16. In summary based on my own 32 years’ experience working in the justice system, an
extensive review of the literature and the opinion of most of my colleagues, the cases we
reviewed (both state and federal) like that of Mark Black indicate that sentencing reform in this
area of Idaho law is overdue. These laws created with good intention perhaps are not working
and continues to cost our nation in a variety of ways every day. Mr. Black’s case represents a
straight forward and compelling example for such needed change.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
I, Mark Gornik, MS, hereby declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the
State of Idaho that the forgoing is true and correct.
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Mark Gornik M.S.






Consultant, trainer, and program analyst private practice: Provided said services to local,
state and federal agencies nationally. Correctional Program design, development, and
implementation regarding evidence based offender interventions and sentence treatment
matching. Lead implementation consultant for the Idaho Drug Court; Treatment program reform
management, Trainer /coach for the Department of Justice regarding communication strategies
for offender to staff communication and de-escalation techniques, Teambuilding,
Counselor/Officer field training, Strategic Planning, Program Evaluation and research.
2002 – 2003
Correctional Program Specialist, National Institute of Correction, Washington, DC
Provide support to states requesting Federal assistance for alcohol drug and related
offender behavior change intervention strategies
1996 - 2002
Bureau of Offender Programs, Bureau Chief,
Idaho Department of Correction, Boise, ID
1995 - 1996
Substance Abuse Bureau, Bureau Chief,
Idaho Department of Correction, Boise, ID
1990 - 1995
Substance Abuse Program and Volunteer Services Manager, Idaho State Correctional
Institution, Boise, ID
1987 - 1990
Alcohol/Drug Counselor and Group Facilitator, Nelson Institute
Alcohol/Drug Program, Boise, ID
1985 - 1987
Machinist, Loya Machine, Boise, ID
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Part-time group facilitator for Adolescent Alcohol/Drug Education,
Nelson Institute, Boise, ID
1980 - 1983
Assistant Manager, European Health Spa, Boise, ID
Manager, European Health Spa, Spokane, WA
1976 - 1980
Sub-contract and contract carpenter work
1973 - 1975
Production foreman in charge of window manufacturing of residential and commercial
windows and glass, Boise, ID
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Governor’s Substance Abuse Task Force
Western Governors Association, Substance Abuse Committee
Drug Court Implementation / Advisory Committee
Boise State University Criminal Justice Advisory Committee
Adjunct Faculty, Boise State University
Faculty, Idaho Conference on Alcohol and Drugs
Faculty, Idaho Correctional Association Conference
Faculty, Lewis & Clark State College Conference on Alcohol/Drugs
Faculty, National Institute of Corrections, National Workshop on Assessing the
Effectiveness of Corrections Programs
Consultant, Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs
Consultant, National Institute of Corrections
Consultant, Idaho Department of Juvenile Justice
Consultant, Idaho Department of Education
Consultant, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS
Juvenile Offenders Sentenced As Adults : Using Effective Interventions In A Systemic Approach Corrections
Today September 2002
Moving from Correctional Program To Correction Strategy Substance Abuse Journal Texas Christian University
2001
Programs for Prisoners, “Is something better than nothing” Boise state University Journal of Health science
August 1998
Co-author, “Correctional Leadership Development Curriculum”, NIC
Co-author, “Correctional Supervisor Plus Curriculum”, NIC
Co-author, “Curriculum for Options, a Cognitive Self Change Program, Training for
Trainers”, NIC
Co-author Motivating Offenders through Evidence Based Communication strategies, NIC
Co-author Cognitive Reflective Communication, NIC
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EDUCATION
Master's of Science
1989-92 Masters of Science, Interdisciplinary Studies, Criminal Justice Programs, Post
Masters studies for PhD. In criminal justice administration All but Dissertation.
Bachelor of Science
1984-86 Bachelor of Applied Science and Associate of Applied Science, Boise State
University, Major in Machine Technology with Minor in Philosophy
1969-71 Academic Studies at San Jose State University, Major in Philosophy with Minor
in Social Science
High School
1969 Graduated Wheatland High School, Wheatland, CA




Certified Alcohol / Drug Counselor
Certified Clinical Supervisor
Consultations 1990 to present
U.S. Department of Health and Human Service, U.S. Department of Justice, “National
Assembly on Drugs, Alcohol Abuse, and the Criminal Offender”
Washington D.C.
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, “Thinking For Change,
Cognitive Programs”
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, “Public Protection through
Offender Reduction: Evidence Based Practice”
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Corrections Program Office,
"National Workshop on Assessing the Effectiveness of Corrections Programs"
U.S. Department Of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Corrections Program Office,
"National Corrections Conference on Substance Abuse Testing, Sanctions, and Treatment"
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, "Correctional Leadership
Development”
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National Institute of Corrections, National Workshop on Assessing the Effectiveness of
Corrections Programs
Regional Field Coordinator, the National Institute of Corrections
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Evaluation &
Accountability Strategies for Correctional Programs
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Advanced Training for
Trainers: Instructional Theory into Practice




Member of Governors task force “Designing a Systems Approach to Substance Abuse Treatment
in Idaho”
1996 – Present
Various workshops and presentations to public schools and community organization on crime,
criminal justice treatment and their relationship to the community.
1995 - 1996
Consultant, LINK (Living Independent Network), Boise, ID
1989 - 1992
Board of Advisors, Terry Reilly Foundation, Boise Clinic Project for the Homeless, Boise, ID
AWARDS/HONORS
2000 – 01 Idaho Department of Correction, Meritorious Service Recognition
1999 Idaho Conference on Alcohol & Drug Dependency, (Accepted award as Bureau Chief)
Award for Outstanding Community or Governmental Organization
1998 Idaho Correctional Association, Cutting Edge Award for Program Development
1995 Idaho Conference on Alcohol & Drug Dependency, Recognition Award for Outstanding
Individual, Community Service
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1993 Board of Idaho Correctional Association, Exceptional Service Medal
1993 Idaho State Correction Institution, Employee of the Month
LIST OF RESOURCES:
 Using Effective Interventions In A Systemic Approach Corrections Today September 2002
 Moving from Correctional Program To Correction Strategy Substance Abuse Journal Texas
Christian University 2001
 Programs for Prisoners, “Is something better than nothing” Boise state University Journal of
Health science August 1998
 Motivating Offenders through Evidence Based Communication strategies, National
Institute of Correction
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Service, Washington D.C. Drug Use Trends
Within Criminal Justice Populations
 U.S. Department of Justice, National Assembly Drugs, Alcohol Abuse, and the Criminal
Offender
 U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Cognitive Programs for
High Risk Offenders
 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Corrections Program Office, A
Meta Analysis of Corrections Programs
 National Institute of Corrections, Assessing the Effectiveness of Corrections Programs
 Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Evaluation & Accountability
Strategies for Correctional Programs.
 Panel Summary; Panel on Medication-Assisted Treatment for Heroin and Other Opiod
Abusing Offenders, October 3, 2007
 Meeting Summary NCJ 244263, October 2007, National Institute of Justice U.S.
Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, A Systems Approach for
Managing Substance-Abusing Offenders
 U.S. Department Of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Institute of
Corrections, A Systems Approach for Managing Substance-Abusing Offenders
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 THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS, INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH A SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER OR
ALCOHOLISM Research current through August 2016.
 TTITLE 37 FOOD, DRUGS, AND OILCHAPTER 27UNIFORM CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCESARTICLE IV
 United States Congress H.R.3489 - Mandatory Minimum Reform Act of 2015
Congressional Archives
 PRISON COMMITTEE REPORTAS PART OF THE STATE LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS STUDY OFCRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN IDAHOOCTOBER 2000
 Handling the Behavior of Drug-Involved Offenders: Supervision That Works
NCJ 241369, December 2012, Recorded Seminar, by Angela Hawken, Mark Kleiman (11
pages)
LIST OF AUTHORITIES:
1. Using Effective Interventions In A Systemic Approach Corrections Today
September 2002
2. Moving from Correctional Program To Correction Strategy egy Substance
Abuse Journal Texas Christian University 2001
3. Programs for Prisoners, “Is something better than nothing” Boise state
University Journal of Health science August 1998
4. Motivating Offenders through Evidence Based Communication strategies,
National Institute of Correction
5. U.S. Department of Health and Human Service, Washington D.C. Drug Use
Trends Within Criminal Justice Populations
6. U.S. Department of Justice, National Assembly Drugs, Alcohol Abuse, and the
Criminal Offender
7. U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Cognitive
Programs for High Risk Offenders
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8. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Corrections Program
Office, A Meta Analysis of Corrections Programs
9. National Institute of Corrections, Assessing the Effectiveness of Corrections
Programs
10. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, Evaluation &
Accountability Strategies for Correctional Programs.
11. Panel Summary; Panel on Medication-Assisted Treatment for Heroin and
Other Opiod Abusing Offenders, October 3, 2007
12. Meeting Summary NCJ 244263, October 2007, National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, A Systems
Approach for Managing Substance-Abusing Offenders
13. National Institute of Corrections, A Systems Approach for Managing
Substance-Abusing Offenders
Syracuse-Siewert, G., Rounsaville, B. J., Ball, S. A., Nuro, K. F., & Carroll, K. M.
(2005). We don’t train in vain: a dissemination trial of three strategies of training
clinicians in cognitive-behavioral therapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 73(1), 106–115. doi:10.1037/0022-006X.73.1.106
14. THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS,
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH A
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER OR ALCOHOLISM Research current
through August 2016.
15. TITLE 37 FOOD, DRUGS, AND OIL CHAPTER 27 UNIFORM
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ARTICLE IV
16. United States Congress H.R.3489 - Mandatory Minimum Reform Act of 2015
Congressional Archives
17. PRISON COMMITTEE REPORT AS PART OF THE STATE LEAGUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS STUDY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN IDAHO
OCTOBER 2000
19.Judicatue Vol 94, number 1, July August 2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of March, 2017, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICOURT system, which sent
a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney at:
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
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IN TH DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT





) DECLARATION OF JOHN CASPER, MD
vs. )
)
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Defendant )
I, JOHN CASPER, MD, depose and state as follows:
1. I am 59 years old, competent to provide this Declaration based on my education and
professional experience; my Curriculum Vitae is attached.
2. I received Doctor of Medicine degree from the University of Washington.
3. I have completed post-graduate medical education including internship, residency in Internal
Medicine, residency in Anesthesiology, and fellowship in Endocrinology.
4. I have completed additional post-graduate medical education, supervision
and training in the specialty of Addiction Medicine.
Electronically Filed
3/21/2017 10:47:16 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
CV01-17-05039
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5. I am a diplomate of the American Board of Addiction Medicine, American Board of Internal
Medicine, and American Board of Anesthesiology, and hold active board certification in each
of these specialties.
6. I am a member of the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) and have been
granted designation of Fellow of the American Society of Addiction Medicine (FASAM)
in recognition of significant contributions to the Society and the field of addiction medicine.
7. I have practiced medicine for over 30 years, and the past 10 years have focused exclusively
on the practice of addiction medicine.
8. I am medical director at two of the three local substance abuse disorder treatment facilities
located in the Idaho cities of Boise, Meridian and Eagle where I am presently working.
9. At these treatment facilities (Center for Behavioral Health of Boise, Idaho, Center
for Behavioral Health of Meridian, Idaho and Bridgeway Health Service of Eagle, Idaho) at
any given time, I am responsible for ongoing evaluation and treatment of at least 500 patients
with addictive disease.
10. During a typical week, I evaluate and treat at least 50 patients with opioid addiction, among
whom at least 75% are past or present users of heroin.
11. I am a participant of regular bi-monthly meetings of the Idaho Office of Drug Policy with
physicians, pharmacists, psychotherapists, nurses, ancillary health care workers, attorneys,
legislators, federal law enforcement officers, local law enforcement officers, officials of the
Idaho department of Health and Welfare and executive directors of state professional
regulatory agencies (Boards of Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy and Nursing. The Idaho
Office of Drug Policy, established by HB 106 (Idaho Code 67-821); the Idaho office of Drug
Policy leads Idaho’s substance abuse policy and prevention efforts by developing strategic
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plans and collaborative partnerships to reduce drug use and related crime, thereby improving
the health and safety of all Idahoans.
12. I have been qualified as expert witness in state courts relating to several cases involving
medical, psychiatric and substance use disorder.
13. I have been retained by Plaintiff’s counsel in the above matter to provide expert opinions
based on the following information:
a. The Presentence Investigation Report filed April 4, 2016;
b. The medical records and other materials submitted with the Declaration of John C.
Lynn filed in support of Mr. Black’s Petition for Post Conviction Relief;
c. Pertinent medical literature;
d. The above outlined clinical experience.
14. Addiction is an illness that has severely affected Mark Black such that he is unable to control
use of drugs, and is compelled to pursue continued use of drugs with an equal or greater
vigor than a normal person pursues safety and survival, or other basic life necessities, despite
the severe adverse consequences resulting from drug use.
15. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 5th Ed. (DSM-5), published by
the American Psychiatric Association, 2013, the term “Addiction” is synonymous with
the classification of “Severe Substance Use Disorder.”
16. Mark Black is affected with a “Severe Substance Use Disorder, as defined by the DSM-5,
based on the presence of the following manifestations:
a. Drugs are often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than is intended;
b. A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain drugs, use drugs, or
to recover from the effects of drugs;
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c. Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use drugs;
d. Continued drug use despite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal
problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of drugs;
e. Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced
because of drug use;
f. Recurrent drug use in situations in which it is physically hazardous;
g. Continued drug use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or
psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by the drug;
h. Development of tolerance manifested by a need for markedly increased amounts
of drugs to achieve intoxication or desired result; and a markedly diminished
effect with continued use of the same amount of drug;
i. Development of withdrawal syndrome following abrupt discontinuation of drug use.
17. It is my opinion that Mark Black does not fit the profile of a high-asset drug trafficker, as
contemplated by Idaho Code §37-2732B for the following reasons:
a. He did not possess high assets;
b. He was not apprehended in the process of exchanging drugs for cash;
c. Based on Mark Black’s severe addiction to heroin, the amount of heroin in his
possession at the time of arrest, 27 grams, would have met his personal consumption
requirement for no more than a few days.
d. It is very uncommon for a high-asset drug trafficker to be a drug addict, and
especially, an addict with the severe features of addiction manifested by Mark Black.
e. High-asset drug traffickers do not commonly resort to theft or prostitution in order
to support a drug addiction, as reflected in Mark Black’s presentence investigation.
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18. The difference in severity of fixed sentences for possessing heroin, as compared to
harmful drugs of abuse such as cocaine or methamphetamine, as set forth in Idaho
Code §37-2732B suggests the presumption or conclusion that harm caused by heroin is
vastly greater. However, conclusive evidence to support this position does not exist.
Although heroin use may be associated with greater lethality to the user, on account of acute
toxic effects (leading to cardiopulmonary arrest), stimulant use (cocaine and
methamphetamine, is much more likely to be associated with violent harm perpetrated by the
drug user on persons or property. Therefore, there is no factual basis to support that heroin
causes more harm drugs of comparison, or to justify more severe penalties, for possession of
heroin.
19. There is considerable disparity in punishment meted out for convictions involving heroin and
prescription opioid analgesic medication (hydrocodone, oxycodone, morphine, methadone,
dihydromorphinone, and others) (compare Idaho Code §37-2732B with Idaho Code §37-
2732(c)). Again, this practice suggests the presumption or conclusion that harm caused by
heroin is vastly greater. However conclusive evidence to support this position does not exist.
It has been shown that the reinforcing effects of oxycodone are similar to those produced by
morphine or heroin. Studies have also shown that several prescription opioids such
as dihydromorphinone (Dilaudid), fentanyl, morphine, and oxycodone — have a potential for
abuse that is similar to, and in some cases even higher than, the potential for abuse with
heroin. This is consistent with the experience of the undersigned’s observations of local
usage patterns, that prescription opioid preparations, which are consistent in purity and
potency, and free of adulterants, are preferred by most users who have eventually resorted to
heroin only because it is less expensive, and there is no other recourse. Heroin abuse may
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result in overdose, acute toxicity and death, but it is not the most frequent opioid associated
with lethality, and although death by heroin overdose continues to rise, the most commonly
prescribed opioid pain relievers, oxycodone and hydrocodone, continue to be involved in
more overdose deaths than any other opioid type. Presently, nearly half of all U.S. opioid
overdose deaths involve a prescription opioid. Therefore, there is no factual basis to support a
presumption or conclusion that more harm is caused by heroin than prescription opioid
medication, or to support more severe punishment for those convicted for possession of
heroin.
20. Mandatory minimum sentencing pursuant to Idaho Code §37-2732B does not take into
account purity of heroin. For example a 2 gram sample of heroin that is 100% pure, and an 8
gram specimen that is 25% pure both contain the same amount of heroin, yet the penalty for
possession of one sample is vastly different than the penalty of possession for the other
sample.
21. Incarceration for conviction of non-violent drug-related crimes is not cost effective.
Numerous studies have shown that for each dollar spent on treatment of substance use
disorders saves at least 7 dollars in costs to society.
22. Cost of incarceration is far more costly than substance use disorder treatment.
23. Those incarcerated for substance use disorders do not receive adequate treatment and
are likely to offend again upon release from incarceration.
I, John Casper, MD, hereby declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the
State of Idaho that the forgoing is true and correct.
Dated this 28th day of March, 2017.
_/s/ John Casper, MD
John Casper, MD
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CURRICULUM VITAE
John B. Casper, M.D.
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Address: John B. Casper, M.D. Phone: 208. 475.0800
4700 N. Cloverdale Rd, Ste. 206. Fax: 208.493.8759
Boise, ID 83713 drc@medcon.org
EDUCATION
Residency: Anesthesiology
University of Utah 1993-1994
University of Arizona 1991-1992
Internal Medicine
University of Washington 1983-1985
Fellowship: Endocrinology





Medical School: Doctor of Medicine 1978-1982
University of Washington





Addiction Medicine (American Board of Addiction Medicine) 2012-2022
Anesthesiology (American Board of Anesthesiology) 1996 (time unlimited)
Endocrinology (American Board of Internal Medicine) 1991-2001
Internal Medicine (American Board of Internal Medicine) 1985 (time unlimited)
HONORS AND AWARDS
University of Washington School of Medicine:
Graduation with Honors in Medicine 1982
John J. Bonica Award for Outstanding 1982
Achievement in Anesthesiology
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Medical Thesis Award 1981
Alpha Omega Alpha 1981
Medical Student Research Training Award 1981
Medical Student Research Training Award 1979
Page 2
HONORS AND AWARDS (cont’d)
University of Idaho:
Graduation with Honors 1978
Phi Beta Kappa 1978
Phi Kappa Phi 1978
American Society of Addiction Medicine:
Fellow 2015
MEDICAL LICENSURE
Idaho 1985 to present
Utah 1993 to present
Washington 1982 to 1991
Oregon 1987 to 1992
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
Boise, ID: Addiction Medicine and Psychiatry 2006-present
Coeur d’Alene, ID: Urgent Care/Occupational Medicine 2004-2010
Boise, ID: Independent medical evaluations and consulting for the 2002-present
Social Security Administration, Department of Veterans
Affairs, attorneys and insurance companies.
Boise, ID: Internal Medicine, Urgent Care and Endocrinology 1995-2002
Nampa, ID: Anesthesiology and Pain Management 1995-1997
Salt Lake City, UT: Internal Medicine and Urgent Care 1993-1995
Nyssa, OR: National Health Service Corps. Internal Medicine 1987-1990
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM)
Treasurer/Secretary Idaho Chapter of ASAM from 2009 to present.
CLINICAL RESEARCH
Investigator and principal investigator in numerous pharmaceutical clinical trials from
1996 to 2002. Details available upon request.
PUBLICATIONS
Berrettini WH, Post RM, Worthington EK and Casper JB. Human platelet vasopressin
receptors. Life Sci 1982, 30: 425-432
Casper JB. Toxicity of L-glutamate of cultured lymphocytes in Huntington’s disease.
University of Washington Press 1982
Stahl WL, Ward CB, Casper JB, and Bird TD. Toxicity of L-glutamate to cultured
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diploid skin fibroblasts and lymphocytes in Huntington’s disease. J Neurol Sci 1984,
66:183-191
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of March, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICOURT system, which sent a Notice of
Electronic Filing to the following to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney at:
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
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JOHN C. LYNN
Attorney at Law






IN TH DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT





) DECLARATION OF FAITH SAWYER, MS
vs. ) LPC
)
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Defendant )
I, FAITH SAWYER, MS depose and state as follows:
1. I am 44 years old, competent to provide this Declaration based on my education and
experience; my resume is attached.
2. I have 1040 hours of documented substance abuse supervised hours that qualify me for the
designation in the state of Idaho as a Qualified Substance Use Disorders Professional per IDAPA
16.07.20.
3. I have conducted approximately 1000 GAIN [Global Assessment of Individual Needs] short
screeners, and approximately 300 GAIN-I Core assessments to determine levels of care,
individual needs, and substance use disorder diagnosis for the state of Idaho in the past 5 years. I
Electronically Filed
3/21/2017 10:47:16 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
CV01-17-05039
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have also conducted hundreds of GAIN assessments to be included in court ordered PSI reports
[Idaho Code 19-2524]. The purpose and scope of said assessments include clinical management,
recommendations for care, treatment, and designation of state approved block grants for patients
involved with the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Probation, Misdemeanor Probation,
Felony Probation, Federal Parole, and Child Protection Services.
4. For the past 3 years, I have worked as an Independent Contractor at a clinic that specializes in
the medication assisted treatment of opioid addiction. In the capacity of a State of Idaho
approved GAIN assessor, LPC, QSUDP treatment provider for substance use disorders [SUD]
and co-occurring disorders [mental health and SUD].
5. At the request of John Lynn I have agreed to review and offer an expert opinion in regards to
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief for Mark Black.
6. I have been retained by Plaintiff’s counsel in the above matter to provide expert opinions
based on the following information:
a. The Presentence Investigation Report filed April 4, 2016;
b. The medical records and other materials submitted with the Declaration of John C.
Lynn filed in support of Mr. Black’s Petition for Post Conviction Relief;
c. Pertinent medical literature;
d. The above outlined professional and clinical experience.
7. The presumption that Mark Black is a drug Trafficker under Idaho Code §37-2732B(6)(B) for
the mere possession of between seven (7) and twenty eight (28) grams of heroin is irrational,
arbitrary and unjust for the following reasons:
Mark Black used and sustained a dependence on heroin, beginning at approximately age 14,
resulting in a 10-year period of significant deficits in functional domains that would reasonably
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preclude Mark from being a drug Trafficker. At the time of his arrest, Mark’s tolerance to the
physiological effects of heroin resulted in an inability to go for more than 4-5 hours without
going into sever withdrawals (as evidenced by the police report dated 9/22/15 in the PSI Report
dated 04/04/16) in which Mark reported injecting 2 grams of heroin prior to arrest and was
witnessed to have gone into withdrawals during the subsequent hours of police detainment. With
this level of tolerance, Mark’s possession of approximately 27 grams of heroin would have lasted
him at most 6-7 days of personal use. Without maintaining this level of use Mark would have
been unable to function in any reasonable capacity due to withdrawals. This condition would
have precluded any intent to sell/traffic heroin as no monetary reward would have been high
enough to counterbalance his severe withdrawal symptoms had he sold the heroin as opposed to
using it to maintain his habit. Per information from court documents Mark’s acute intoxication
and withdrawal potential per the ASAM1 criteria would be extremely high as evidenced by his
current and past abuse history as reflected in the PSI Report, Intermountain Hospital Record,
and Arrest report as follows:
Last known use of opiates; while incarcerated Mark sought medical treatment for acute
withdrawal symptoms (10/04/2015) after admitting to swallowing a “2-3-gram balloon of
heroin” 11 days’ prior that had “burst” internally. On 10/25/2015 was found in possession
of a “Suboxone Strip in his sock”. Prior to incarceration, at time of arrest 09/22/2015
reported using “2-3 grams of heroin intravenously multiple times a day to prevent
withdrawals, prior to reports daily IVDU heroin for 3 months, prior to was in Drug Court,
was unable to stop using despite risk of incarceration. Reports longest period of sobriety was
“18 months between 2012-2014”. Reports being unable to stop using outside of a controlled
environment (incarceration), reports of multiple accidental overdoses, increased tolerance,
multiple failed attempts at lower levels of care, was unable to complete IOP, reports history
of suicidal ideation due to being unable to stop using drugs, reports history of “selling
himself” to obtain drugs. Mark reports first using at approximately age 12. Per use history,
Mark’s use resulted in multiple minor in possession charges, due to continued and sustained
use. Mark has a long criminal history postdating use of illicit substances, criminal history
includes multiple petty thefts, frequenting, possession. Inability to stop using despite
1 ASAM is the national standard of care guideline used by addiction professionals, as well as
adopted by IDAPA to establish levels of care and treatment protocols.
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previous efforts, multiple overdoses, risk to self and others-IV drug use, Hepatitis positive,
little to no understanding of how use negatively impacts mental health, history of depression
and suicidal ideation (onset age 15).
To put this in plain language, what it would feel lie to be Mark Black? Imagine you have
gone two weeks without food. You will not die, but you will be experiencing significant deficits
in your ability to function normally. You will not be able to sleep a full eight hours, you will
awaken multiple times with severe cramps in your stomach, you will dream about food, you will
experience brain fog, an inability to recall information, you will experience impairment in your
ability to control your emotions, you may feel angry one minute and then tearful the next, you
will be hyper focused on the smell of cooking foods to the point of distraction, you will lack
energy and feel waves of dizziness and nausea. Now imagine you are told to continue your
normal duties, such as driving to work, working itself and maintaining friendships. You would
develop a hyper focused desire for food, to the deficit of all other needs. How long until you
considered taking a coworker’s lunch from the break room? Stealing a candy bar off an absent
employee’s desk? Eating your child’s stash of Easter candy? How long until any and all of these
acts would become justifiable? Imagine the things you would find yourself doing, that you would
have never considered, just to fulfil your physiological need to eat. Mark Black, severely
addicted to drugs, must use heroin to survive. He began using drugs at the age of 14; he was a
child who was not afforded the right to care in a residential treatment program who grew up to be
a young man whom the judicial system has continued to fail - even incarcerated he cannot stop
feeding his addiction. Mark Black will no longer be a young man after ten years when he will be
eligible for parole. However, Mark Black will never be free from his addiction until he is treated
for his addiction, not penalized for being an addict.
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To further the notion that the fixed sentencing statute for Heroin is irrational, arbitrary and
unjust, had Mark been convicted of trafficking in the equivalent grams (28) of methamphetamine
he would serve a fixed sentence of 3 years minimum. To receive a 10 year fixed sentence, he
would have had to be in possession of 200 grams of methamphetamine versus the same sentence
for 7-28 grams of heroin. Of the two classes of drugs, persons under the influence of
methamphetamine/amphetamines (stimulants) are more likely to commit violent offenses,
behave aggressively, and experience drug induced psychosis. In contrast, persons under the
influence of heroin (sedative) are less likely to commit violent offenses due to the drugs effect
of sedation, an intense feeling of calm and euphoria, and drowsiness.
Also, heroin is the only class of drug included in Idaho Code §37-2732B that, due to its
significant lethality and higher addictive quality than other classes of drugs, is dually persecuted
and protected under the law. On October 17, 2000, Congress passed the Drug Addiction
Treatment Act (DATA) which permits qualified physicians to treat narcotic dependence with
schedules III-V narcotic controlled substances that have been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for that indication. The legislation waives the requirement for obtaining a
separate Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registration as a Narcotic Treatment Program
(NTP) for qualified physicians administering, dispensing, and prescribing these specific FDA
approved controlled substances. Opioid agonists like Methadone and Suboxone can be legally
prescribed by a designated professional to treat opioid addiction. Physicians registered with the
DEA as practitioners who apply and are qualified pursuant to DATA are issued a waiver (DWP)
and will be authorized to conduct maintenance and detoxification treatment using specifically
approved schedule III, IV, or V narcotic medications. DATA waivers are only granted to
qualified physicians. (https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/docs/dwp_buprenorphine.htm)
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8. Criminalizing and incarcerating drug addiction is an ineffective and irrational basis to solve
the opioid epidemic in our present society. As of 12:08 December 30, 2016, Ada County Jail
currently houses 17 heroin drug Traffickers. To summarize, potentially 17 Ada County residents
who, if convicted, will be incarcerated for the next 10 years at an approximate cost of 527,
000.00 dollars (The Price of Prisons What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers JANUARY 2012
(UPDATED 7/20/12). Most of who will more than likely, return to heroin use upon release from
prison,
Over 7.2 million people were incarcerated or on probation/parole at year-end 2009 [1].
A history of drug use or misuse is pervasive among prison inmates by every measure,
including prior use, use at the time the offense is committed, drug abuse, and drug
dependence [2-4]. Despite the magnitude of the problem of substance use disorders
among criminal justice populations, prisoners have limited access to evidence-based
substance abuse treatment during incarceration, during the transition to the community,
or while under community supervision [3,5-7]. Therefore, inmates are often released
without the tools to avoid returning to drugs after release from prison.
Studies in the United States and other countries have shown a high risk of drug-related
death after release from prison [8-19]. Overdose rates peak in the first few weeks after
release [8,20]. For instance, in prisoners released in Washington State, overdose
mortality rates were 12-fold higher than what would be expected in similar demographic
groups in the general population. In the first two weeks after release, the risk of overdose
was even greater, with an adjusted relative risk of 129 [20]. Accidental overdoses
accounted for nearly one-quarter of deaths post-release and were related to cocaine,
other psychostimulants, opioids, alcohol, tricyclic antidepressants, and multiple drugs in
combination. Suicide was the 4th leading cause of death and likely included intentional
overdoses [20]. Binswanger, I. A., Nowels, C., Corsi, K. F., Glanz, J., Long, J., Booth, R.
E., & Steiner, J. F. (2012). “Return to drug use and overdose after release from prison: a
qualitative study of risk and protective factors.” Addiction Science & Clinical
Practice, 7(1), 3. http://doi.org/10.1186/1940-0640-7-3].
To further the notion of discriminatory practices and unequal protection under the law,
pursuant to the American Counseling Association [ACA] Code of Ethics, and Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA], licensed professional counselors [LPC] must
protect the rights of their client’s confidentiality by law and may only break client confidentiality
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to report child abuse or neglect, active threat of suicide, active threat of homicide. A client who
seeks treatment for substance abuse is afforded the same confidentiality, even if said client
reportedly engages in illegal activity such as selling drugs or using drugs. To further ensure
protection for clients seeking substance abuse treatment Idaho Code §18-215 and the Code of
Federal Regulations, CFR 42 part 2, mandate that information provided by persons seeking
substance abuse treatment shall not be used to initiate criminal charges or investigation of a
patient’s illegal drug use 2 otherwise patients would not seek treatment from professionals due to
fear of incrimination.
Had any of the aforementioned 17 drug traffickers, sought drug treatment in the State of
Idaho, they would not have been charged with a crime and would instead have been eligible to
access state appointed funds, block grants, for drug treatment to include residential care, safe and
sober housing, transportation, case management, outpatient treatment, and treatment for co-
occurring mental health/substance use disorders.
9. In my 5 years of experience working with clients, both involved and not involved, with the
judicial system and being treated for substance abuse, the most successful treatment protocols
include motivationally challenging clients to “buy-in” into treatment, that is, having something to
lose - freedom, children, spouse, etc. Shame and blame are not motivating factors for an addict,
2 CONFIDENTIALITY OF PATIENT RECORDS; 42 U.S.C. 290dd-2
(a) Requirement
“Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient which are maintained
in connection with the performance of any drug abuse prevention function conducted, regulated,
or directly or indirectly assisted by any department or agency of the United States…”
(c) Prohibition against use of record in making criminal charges or investigation of patient
“Except as authorized by a court order granted under subsection (b)(2)(C) of this section, no
record referred to in subsection (a) of this section may be used to initiate or substantiate any
criminal charges against a patient or to conduct any investigation of a patient”
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nor is the risk of incarceration if the client already has nothing to lose (i.e. is homeless, unable to
care for themselves, unable to stop using despite risk to self/imminent danger/overdose, has
significant untreated co-occurring mental health disorders). At the time of his arrest, Mark Black
found himself in a situation where he had nothing to lose. I have worked with many clients, like
Mark Black, who have nothing to lose. Collaborative efforts with probation officers, mental
health and substance abuse treatment providers, together with the use of appropriate
incarceration have resulted in increased and sustained periods of sobriety, re engagement in the
community in a pro social manner, and a reduction in incarceration. A 10 year fixed sentence for
an addict such as Mark Black is not only counterproductive to treatment, but taxes our society
unnecessarily and only serves to exacerbate the problem of addiction.
I, Faith Sawyer MS, LPC, QSUPD, hereby declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to
the law of the State of Idaho that the forgoing is true and correct.
Dated this 27th day of February, 2017.
/s/Faith Sawyer MS LPC QSUDP
Faith Sawyer, MS LPC QSUDP
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CURRICULUM VITAE
FAITH SAWYER MS LPC QSUDP
1032 S Bridgeway Place, Eagle, ID 83616 | 208-761-5308 | fmkline@gmail.com
EDUCATION
Walden University, Minneapolis, MN
MS Mental Health Counseling 2011
Graduated with Honors-Member of The Counseling and
Academic and Professional Honor Society International Chi
Sigma Iota
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN
BS Speech Language Pathology 1998
Minored in Linguistics
CERTIFICATIONS/LICENSURE
Licensed Professional Counselor LPC-4780 2011 – Current
Certified GAIN assessor (Global Assessment of Individual Needs) 2013 – Current
Qualified Substance Use Disorder Professional 2013 – Current
RELATED EXPERIENCE
Business Psychology Associates
Utilization Management July 2011 –
February 2013
Clinical management of state funded substance abuse treatment
for Medicaid, Idaho Department of Corrections, Child
Protection Services, Misdemeanor Probation, Juvenile Justice,
Parenting Women, Intervenors Drug Usurers (IVDU Funding).
Assessed for levels of care per American Society of Addiction
Medicine (ASAM) guidelines, clinical management of
residential admission and continued stays, crisis calls.
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Pioneer Health Resources
LPC-Co Occurring Disorder March 2013 –
March 2014
Completed GAIN assessments, Clinical Diagnostic Assesmnet
(CDA), group and individual counseling with an emphasis on
co-occurring (substance abuse and mental health) populations
involved in the Judicial System (misdemeanors, felonies,
Juvenile probation, CPS). Coordination of care with the
supervising agencies (i.e. Probation officers, CPS case
workers).
Independent Contractor Bridgeway Health Resources
Licensed Professional Counselor January 2014-
Current
Clinical assessments for mental health and substance abuse
treatment disorders. women’s trauma counseling, substance
abuse counseling for clients on Buprenorphine agonist
therapy for opioid addiction, individual counseling, family
counseling.
MEMBERSHIPS/PROFESSIONAL PARTICIPATION
American Counseling Association -Member in Good Standing since 2011
Participant in the Prescription Drug Abuse Workgroup Gayle Hines
Idaho Office of Drug Policy
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of March, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICOURT system, which sent a Notice of
Electronic Filing to the following to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney at:
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net







Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court




Attorney at Law 
500 W. Bannock St 




Attorney for Appellant 
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I, JOHN C. LYNN, depose and state as follows: 
1. That I am the attorney of record for the above-named Petitioner. 
2. Exhibit A, attached hereto, is true and correct copy of a letter I personally received from Dr. 
Robert M. Franklin, dated July 28, 2016. 
3. Exhibit B, attached hereto, are true and correct copies of medical records received from 
Intermountain Hospital, Boise, Idaho, regarding the Petitioner, which I personally requested. 
Declaration of John C. Lynn p. 1 
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4. Exhibit C, attached hereto, is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the Statement of 
Purpose supporting Idaho Code §37-2732B which I personally found from the Session Laws 
located at the Idaho State law Library, Boise Idaho. 
5. That I personally sought the Amended Order Releasing Presentence ("PSI") Report To 
Defense Counsel in Case No. CR-FE-2015-13589, prepared for Petitioner's sentencing dated 
June 14, 2016; the Amended Order was granted on November 22, 2017, giving permission 
to release said PSI to Petitioner's expert witnesses herein, Dr. John Casper, Faith Sawyer, 
MS, LPC and Mark Gornik, MS; the PSI was released to these experts by me personally 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 32(h). 
DATED This 16th day of March, 2017. 
_/s/ John C. Lynn 
JOHNC.LYNN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
I, John C. Lynn, hereby declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State 
of Idaho that the forgoing is true and correct. 
DATED This 16th day of March, 2017. 
Declaration of John C. Lynn p. 2 
_/s/ John C. Lynn 
JOHNC.LYNN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of March, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing 
document with the Clerk of the Court using the !COURT system, which sent a Notice of 
Electronic Filing to the following to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney at: 
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
DATED This 21st day of March, 2017. 
Declaration of John C. Lynn p. 3 
_/s/ John C. Lynn 
JOI-INC.LYNN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Family Medicine, Eagle 
July 28, 2016 
To: JOHN C. L ThTN 
Attorney at Law 
6661 N. Glenwood St. 
Boise, ID 83714 
Re: Mark Black 
Sarah Gerrish, MD 
Coleen Hulbert, MD. MPH 
David Hulbert, MD 
Mont Tolman, DO 
Robert Franklin, DO {Suite 2107) 
I am writing in regard to the above named patient Mark Black. I have known Mark since birth 
and I have had a long physician-patient relationship with him. 
I watched him grow from a promising young man with significant potential into a lost soul who 
could not seem to find his place in life. Unfortunately, he began experimenting with illegal drugs 
in a futile effort to "fit in" and subsequently began the dowmvard spiral of drug addiction and all 
the inherent problems that are a consequence of those choices. 
I absolutely believe that drug addiction is an illness and should be treated as such. 1 think there is 
a plethora of information validating that position and I am including a very good m1icle which 
outlines and substantiates this position. 
I hope this info1mation is of use to you. 
Please feel free to call or write if I can provide any further information. 
Robert M. Franklin, DO 
3101 E. State Street, Suite 1100 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 




DRUG ADDICTION IS AN ILLNESS, NOT A CRIME 
United States Justice Department's statistics confirm the U.S .A. has more prisoners than any 
other country in the world. In 2006, that number was 2.5 million and continues to rise. Between 
2000 and 2006, the nation experienced the largest jump in incarcerations ever. Criminal justice 
experts attribute the exploding prison population to harsher sentencing laws, particularly those 
related to illegal substance possession/use. 
Whether addiction is an actual disease remains a hotly debated topic - one which probably will 
continue. Webster' s defines 'disease' as follows: "Any departure from health presenting marked 
symptoms; malady, illness; disorder". Drug addiction ce11ainly meets that measw-e; show me a 
drug addict and I'll show you someone presenting symptoms of illness, malady and disorder. 
Drug addiction is responsible for many psychological problems; including, depression, mania, 
. violent fantasies , etc. 
Drug addiction leads to serious physical ailments, including heaii attack, stroke, organ failure and 
death 
The drug addict's life most certainly is one of "dis-order"; no longer able to hold ajob, relate to 
other human beings, to care for their personal hygiene, there is no order to be found 
The child of an addict is 3-5 times more likely to become alcoholic/addict as well; bolstering the 
data that suggests there is a strong genetic (medical) link 
Our country is in need of a serious shift in overall thinking about how drug addicts should be 
treated. Incarceration does not work; plain and simple. Few states have the money ( or interest) to 
devote to providing treatment for addicts behind bars. In fact, statistics revel that many addictions 
actually grow ,;vhile in prison. The availability of drugs and the need (desire) to escape leads drug 
addicts to use more and for those not exposed to drugs in the ' outside world' to begin using. 
With no treatment available and drugs easily obtained, how can we expect our prison population 
to achieve and maintain sobriety? It seems we cannot; at least, not at this point. The most recent 
data reveals that im11ates who are serving time on drug-related charges experience the highest 
recidivism rates of all offenders. This is due to 1. They've not been given any tools to work ,vith 
while in jail, 2. Once 'on the street' they return to old circumstances and behaviors 3. Even 
ainong addicts pai1icipating in recovery programs, relapse is fai rly common. 
Actress, Tatum O'Neal , made news recently when she was anested for purchasing crack-cocaine. 
Ms. O'Neal has fought a long battle v,;ith substance abuse and has stayed cleai1 and sober for 
yeai·s at a time. Unlike "Jolm Smith", who would have been locked up immediately for this 
illegal behavior; Ms. O'Neal has been sent to a treatment center to recover. ALL addicts should 
have the same opportunities to recover. !fwe cannot appeal to Americans' compassion, perhaps 
we caii. appeal to their greed. The cost of incarcerating an addict costs 1 OX ·more than treatment 
does. Add that to the fact, that many less people ai·e likely to re-offend after treatment (vs. jail) 
and you can see how the savings would be quite significant. 
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Prosecutors in many states (like New York) do have the ability to recommend treatment for drug 
addicts vs. an-est and conviction. Unfortunately, many prosecutors are more concerned with their 
"win-loss" record; they consider conviction a victory and treatment a defeat. Our judicial system, 
in no way rewards prosecutors for doing the compassionate thing; that is something that must 
change. 
There is a widely-held belief in America that Holland has a permissive attitude towards drugs; it 
does not. Rather, the country has adopted a more practical approach. Large-scale drng trafficking 
is still vigorously prosecuted. Drug use, however, is considered to be a public-health issue, not a 
criminal one. Addicts who are caught stealing or breaking other laws are prosecuted, but they are 
not arrested for possession. 
The U.S.A. might be able to learn a few things about handling drug abuse by studying the Dutch. 
Thirty years ago the population of heroin addicts in the Netherlands was estimated to have been 
25,000 to 30,000. While the counb:y's population has grown by 6 percent in the past tlu·ee 
decades, the number of heroin addicts has remained vi1iually the same Very few new users have 
joined their ranks and as the "old-timers" age, they are dying off, leading to a fmiher decline in 
heroin use. 
Wim van den Brink, a psychiatrist at the Academic Medical Center of the University of 
Amsterdam, sums up the country' s drug policy this way "The view is that addiction is a brain 
disease and it requires treatment, not incarceration". This policy is responsible for a remarkable 
statistic: approximately 70 percent of Holland' s drug addicts are in treatment programs; only 
10-15 percent of America's are. 
We often hear "If it ain't broke, don' t fix it". Well, our approach to treating drug addicts is 
completely broken and in serious need of immediate repair. 
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CHIEF COMPLAINT: A  Caucasian male voluntarily admitted ro NewSlart program for heroin 
withdrawal. 
HOSPITAL COURSE: Paticnr relapsed several months ago after a family member completed suicide. The use 
is escalated. He has gotten into trouble with the court and now has a lengthy prison sentence ahead of him. He 
w.1s in jai) brie0y and got out at the advice of his family .1s well as parole officer, he decided to come in to the. 
NcwStart program in the lace hours at last night. ,Ve arc unable to authorize his insurance, however, and he will 
have to be discharged left face large bill. 
Pacient denies SI. He stares he strictly wants help with his substance use. He denies HI. He denies perceptual 
disturbances and is not gravely clisablecl. He is at the encl of his ,vithclrawal and does not meet criteria for 
medically supervised withdrawal either. We have no choice, but to discharge him. 
Patient will be speaking with our -social worker to see what options are ffVailable and what treatment centers do 
contract with insurance. I strongly encouraged him to go to those to setup an appointment and get enrolled as 
soon as possible. In the meantime, he has these services at drug court a vailable to him and he also has outpatient 




1. Opioid dcpcndcnce,scvcre. 
2 . Amphetamine depcndence,scvcrc. 
3. Benzodiazepine dependence, severe. 
4. THC dependence, severe. 
5. Depressive disorder, not otherwise specified. 
MEDICAL: 
1. Hepatitis C status post inte1feron treatments. 
2. History of pleural effusion. 
j _ Opioid withclra,Yal. which resolving. 
STRESSORS: 
1. Lcg::il strcssors . 
2. Poor psychosocial support. 
3. Difficulty with finances. 
PLAN: 
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D [SCHARG E SUlVHVIARY 
from substance treatment. 1l1is alone is not a medically acute reason to keep him here. He dcn.ics 
suicidal ideation. He denies homicidal ideation. He is not gravely disabled and he docs nol meet criteria 
for commitment. 
2. We arc havhig a meet with our social worker to figure out other options and other treatment 
settings, highly recommended following up with the treatment. center lhaL he can afford and buy his 
insurance as soon as possible in order to reduce the risk of relapse given that he is the action phase of his 
commilmcnl to gcr treatment. 
:; . He denies SJ and agrees lo use emergency services in lieu of harming himsc; lf. Ri sk of ha1111 ro self is 
low. 
CONDITION ON DISCHARGE: Unchanged . 
PROGNOSIS: Guarded. 
DISPOSITION: Home, but \,·c arc directing him ro go to another substance dependency treatment center as soon 
as he gets out of here. Diet regular. ActiYity, no restrictions other than to abstain from substances. Patient was 
evaluated and detcnnincd not to be an imm.inc11t danger to self or others. The issue of access to fircanns \\'aS 
considered and addressed. Patient is stabilized for lmYer level of care and although the patient has chronic risk 
factors, he is not committable by state law. No lab followup is needed. 1 sent him home with 7 tablets of 
trazodonc (50 mg p.o. at bedtime p.r.n. insonmia). Again, patient denies SI and is low risk of harm to self. I think 
that he would rec11ly benefit from substance treatment and \\'e are pointing him in that right direction for his 
insurance. I hope that he will check himself in. 
Ekctronically signed by James Pikiel , MD on 5/22/2015 
5:11 :14 A1'.'1 
DD: 5il9/10l5 15:40 
DT: 5/20/2015 21 :18 






303 North Allumbaugh 
Boise·, ID 83704 
PATIENT: BLACK, rvl1\RK 
05/18/2015 
MRN: 546-000047195 
ADMIT DATE: ACCT: 10078640017 
DISCHARGE DATE: JI ATTENDING: 
  
HISTORY & PHYSICAL 
DATE OF SERVICE: 05/19/2015 
IDENTIFICATION: A  male patient of Dr. Piktcl. 
I was asked by Dr. Piktcl to consult on this patient and collabornre with the medical team to evaluate and treat any 
non-psychiatric 1neclical conditions including metabolic, neurologic, ai1cl endocrine ft1nction; as well as infectious 
illness and/or trauma that may lw-ve precipitated his admission to 'lntermountain Hospital. TI1is information was 
gk:aiicd from the patient ,,·ho appears to b.c a reliable historian, as well as rc,iicw of his chart. 
C:HlEF COlVIPLAINT: ''I've got to get sober." 
SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT RISK: Low. 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ADMISSION: Pariem is in the hospital because of heroin acldicrion. He lias been 
using he1:oin since the age of 14. He wellt to Boise High, graduated at the age of 16 because he did not want to 
deal with school anymore, bur he \Vas already heavily inro heroin by the time he had graduated. He has been in 
and out of prison and county jail. "\Vhile he was in prison and county jail he used. I asked him how he afforded to 
do that. He said you either know people or you sell yourself. He did not disclose to me which he did. He is here 
funded by his ii1stirance through lvfave1ick_. place \Vhcrc he works, and then his orher 1 O?.,o he believes his parents 
are going to help pay for. Parents hath work for HP . Mom is now retired and remarried. Dad still continues to 
work as an engii1eer and has a girlfriend. Patient is the youngest of 4. He says that there is nobody in the family 
who suffers from chemJCal dependence or alcoholism. Family history docs h<1vc hear·t disease, cancer, and other 
issues. He appears to be very depressed. He has court on TI1ursclay. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Surgeries: He had chest tube placed for pleural effusion and that has been 
twice. ALLERGY TO i\:IEDICATION: CONTRAST DYE. Chronic Probkms: Hepatitis C which he was 
treated with Interferon nncl tests negative now. He had history of chest tube placement because of plenral effusion 
and he still has chest pain when he rakes deep inspirations, nicotine addiction, chemical dependence.-
I NJ<8CTIOUS ILLNESSES: No further exposures to l1epatitis, meningitis, tuberculosis, or any sexually 
transmitccd infections . 
Breast, genitalia, rectal e:-;am arc all offered and declined. 
IVIEDlCATIONS: He is on opiate cleto:,,: protocol. 
This is his first inpatient hospitalization . 
ABUSE HISTORY: He denied. 
SQCIAL.HlSTORY: He smokes about a pack ol'cigarcttcs q. daily for the last 5 01· 6 years , no alcohol, drug of 








in a relationship. Not married and he has no chilclren. 
Page 2 
FAMILY HISTORY: Mom and dad are alive and not married to each.other. Family history is as above. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEiVIS: Is essentially negative. He denies having auditory or visual hallucinations. No 
changes in sense of taste or smell. No drainage from his eyes, blurred vision, sore throat, or sinus trouble. No 
rashes or sores on his skin or skin breakdown. No changes in c·ncrgy or weighr loss or gain. No lymph node 
enlargement or sign of infection. Denies gastric reflux, heartburn, indigestion, constipation, loose stools, or blood 
in his stools. No burning with urination, kiclney or flank pain. Lungs free of wheezes . No procluctive cough . No 
night sweats. No chesr pain or pressure. No history of seizures. No musculoskcletal problems. 
PHYSICAL EXAJVIINA TION: 
I-IEIGI-IT/WEIGJ-IT: He is 67 inchc~, \\'Cighs 199 pounds. 
VITAL SlGNS: Temperature 98, ptilse 83 , respirations I 6, and blood pressure I 13/76. 
GENERAL: He is alert, he is oriented, he is very p_leasant. 
SKIN: He has scars from chcsr rubes, ·no signs of infection. 
HEENT: Heacl is nonnocephalic, atraumatic. Eyes are PERRLA, EOMI. Funduscopic exam benign. Visual 
fields full to confrontation at 90 degrees bilaterally. Ears: Canals are clear, tympanic membranes pearly gray, 
landmarks arc intact, no scarring or pcrforarion. Nose: Hcalrhy mucosa, nonnal rurbinates, no septa I deviation. 
rvlouth:. He has fair dentition. He is in need of a dental exam and teeth cleaning. 
NECK: No lymphadenopathy or thyromegaly, carotid pulses free ofbniits. 
BACK: No CV A tenderness, good spine. alignment. 
CHEST: Lung sounds clear to auscultation anterior/posterior. 
CAR.I)L<\C: :RRR no munnur, gallop, rub, or cxtrasystolc. 
ABDOivIEN: Soft, flat, nontcnder, no organomegaly, bowel sounds prcsc1it. 
L'{IVIPHATICS: No positive inguinal nodes, normar femoral pulses. 
~XTRE?vHTIES: PPP, full .flcxion/e:xtcnsion of extremities, full range of motion, muscle strength is 5/5. 
BREAST/GE.NIT AL/RECTAL: Arc offered and declined. 
NEUROLOGICAL: He is alert, oriented, yery pleasant. I will defer the mental status e:'\am to his psychiatrist. 
Cranial nerve I: Able to identify spices. H, III, IV, VI: Please refer to the eye exam. V: Jaw clench strong and 
symmetric, VII: Facial muscles are symmetric and strong bilaterally. VIII: Hearing is within normal limits to 
whisper. IX: Palate is symmetric. Uvi.tla rises miclline. X: Voice is clear. No hoarseness . XI: SCM and 
trapezius muscles arc srrong and symmetric. XII: Tongue prorrudcs midlinc. No dyskincsia, tics, or involuntary 
movements on this exam. Muscle strength and coordination intact. DTRs are 1+ upper and lower. Negative 
Babinski. Ci;rebellar exam reveals a brisk linger-to-nose maneuver, and outstretched hands free of tremor. The 
patient had fonnal RAIVfs of upper extremities, and these arc symmetric. He has a nomial gait and balance, able 
to ambulate heeHo-toe. Negative Romberg. Senso1-y exam reveals no lateralization on position, vibration, touch, 
or temperature. 
LABS: A1·e pending. 
PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSES: Per psychiatrisl. 
MEDICAL DIAGNOSES/PLAN: 
0 Hepatitis C. Patient no longer tests positive. He has done I11tc1fcron. 
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on occasion with deep inspiration. He is told to use ibuprolcn for his chest pain . 
o Nicotine addiction . Discussed smoking cessation <1ncl ellects ofn icotine. 
o ALLERGIES TO INTRA VENOUS (TV) CONTRA.ST DYE. He will not be getting any IV contrast 
dye here. 
o C011rinuc medications ordered by psychiatrist Labs ordered by psychiatri.st and medical staff at:c 
appropriate .as this pnticnt's adnYissibn may be related to hepatic, renal , or thyroid function . 
Electron ically signed by Janet Grat~ N.P. on 5/!9/2.0!5 
2.:44:54 Ptvl 
DD : 5119i2015 12:30 
DT: 5/19/20 15 12:59 
Job#: 1117:'2224 
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CHIEf COMPLAINT: A  Caucasian male voluntarily admitted to NewStart for opioid withdrawal 
treatment an.cl introduction to recovery. 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: It took me over 70 minutes to read the medical records, see the patient, 
,md formulate my assessment. 
Patient states that he has been mired in si1bstances for most of his adult lifo, essentially since he was 16 years old. 
He has tried eYe1~1hing and anything and has been in and out of drug cou1t. Unfo1tunately, his grandpa 
eom1111ttcd suicide about a week and a half ago and this caused paticm to want to use and he relapsed 01.1 heroin. 
He ,,-ent to jail on Thursday. He continued to use inside Ada County jail allegedly and he was advised to come 
here by his parole officer as well as his family members,_ so he checked himself into NcwSrarc the day he was 
released from jail. 
U-to·x showed positive for amphetamines, mctlrnmphctami.J.1e, IBC, benzos, oxyeodone, and other opioids. The 
patient admits to using all of those. 
Unfortunately, the patient's insurance will not provide coverage for. this day ru1d he is not authorized 10 conr.inu.c at 
NewSta1t. We will talk wiih him about providing other services including drug cou1t and 1m1ybe looking into 
other establishments such as the Walker Center to help him out. places where his insurance can cover. The 
patient is going 10 mlk with the social "·orkcr prior to being rclcasccl. 
He aclc11na·ntly denies SI. States it has never been an issue \\"ith him. He denies homicidal ideation. He de1iies 
perceptual disturbances including A VI-I and he is in full control of his faculties . He states that his sleep has been 
okay with the exception of the last two nights in jail. His appetite bas been tine. His concentration has been 
okay. He is essentially not teding depressed, though he admits that his mood is a bit clown as a result of his legal 
issues. He tells me there is a large prison scn:tence looming. 
He tells me that he would like to have seven tabs of trazoclone on hand \\'hen he discharges to help regulate his 
sleep. I concurred that this will be a good idea. I wished him luck and we had to disclrnrgc him because of his 
insurance. He does 1101 meet criteria to stay c1ncl he is not committable by Idaho State law, so we let him go. 
PAST PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY: He has never been hospitalized before for psychiatric reasons, but 
apparently he has had a couple of rehabilitation incidents. He used to be on SSRls back when he was tnking 
interferon, but no longer is 011 SSRis medications. He docs not sec a thcrapis[, bul he has a drug courc where he 
has counseling services available for him. 
SUBSTANCE HISTORY: 1-fo is aclivcly using opioids, mnphcramirn;s, benzocliazcpincs . THC, 
mcthamphetamine, and alcohol as well as tobacco. He appears to be contemplated about quitting because or' bad 
outcome with his legal stressors. He formulated an action plan to come here. We arc going to work on getting 





tv(EDrCAL RECORD fi: 
BLACK, iVIJ\RK 
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PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION 
MEDICAL. HISTORY: History ofhcpatiris C, status post interferon treatment and now negative. He has a 
history of pleural effusions and collap·sed lungs but nothing since iVlarch 2013 . No other active meclicnl issues. 
He denies hypenension, asthma, diabetes, or closed head injuries, traumas or seizures. 
ALLERGIES: HE IS ALLERGIC TO IV CONTRA.ST AND HE HAS DERMATOLOGICAL 
REACTIONS TO SOME METALS AND SOAPS. 
FAMILY HISTORY: His grandfather successfi.illy completed suicide just a week and a half ago. Otherwise, he 
dc1i.ics family history of psychiatric illness ro me. 
SOCIAL HISTORY: The patient was born and raised in Idaho. He says the child is mostly· positive. He denied 
abqsc or neglect. He actually graduated high school at age 16, but then got mired into drugs and is nor doing any 
post-secondary education, instead he went the route of dmg con rt, len,6'1:hy prison sentences, and he has been 
essentially floundering in and out of jail since then. He basically had an occupation as a plumber, now he is a 
manager at·Ivlavcrick Station. He is not married. He has no kids . 
R.EVIE\V OF SYSTEMS: He denies headache, chest pnin, shortness of breath, or focal neurological deficits, 
but he still states he is feeling the withdrawal from opioids. 
VITAL SIGNS: Blood pressure I l 3/76, hea1t rate 83, respiratory rate 16. temperature 97. 














General Appearance: Young Caucasian male clean, well groomed, smells of stale cigarette -smoke 
though. 
Orientation; He is oriented x4. He is quite attenti\'e to me, lmt at times seems a little distracted. 
rvloocl/Affect: Mood is euthymic. Affect looks a little bit restricted. 
Speech: Artieulate and coherent. 
Thought processes: Logicar and goal-directed. Associations are intact. 
Psychornotor activities : Within normal limits . 
Memory: Completely intact, recent ancl remote. 
Intelligence: His IQ is average, maybe high based on vocabulary and fund of knowledge. 
Thought Content: Suicidal icleation , he denies. He denies homicidal ideation. 
Perceptual disturbance: There is no eviclence of perceptual disturbance including A VI-I or delusions. 
Abstract abilitv: Intact. 
rnsight/Juclgment: His insight is intact, but his judgment is poor based on his ongoing drug use. 
Capacity to do his ADLs: He is able to complete his ADLs. 
STRENGTHS: He is treatment seeking, hns good lifo satisfaction. 
WEAKNESSES: .Fie has poor coping skills . . 
U-to.x is positive for opioicls, o:-:ycodo11c, amphetamines, bc11wdinzcpi11cs, Tl-iC, and 111ctha111p.l1ctaminc all 









ASSESSMENT: A  Caucasinn male who meets criteria for opioid withdrawal and polysubstancc 
depc11de11ce issues. He was admitted to NcwStart for heroin withdrawal rn1cl imrocluction 
recovery. Unforlunarcly, his insurance company is not authorizing this slay, although he meets Ivlcdicare criteria 
for coq1plicatcd detoxification and substance treatment. He is actually c1t rhe end of his withdrawal and there is no 
immediate need for medical supervision of this since he has been in Ada County jail fbr the last two clays. lns\eac\ 
we will. have to lel him go. He denies suicidal ideation. I-te denies homicidal ideation. He is in full control of his 
thoughts. He simply cannot afford stay here and chc insurance as well as finances proviclecl rachcr large hurdle 
or barrier to overcome. 
The patient 1s open to getting treatment services and we can give him options to .other places ro try such as the 
Walker Center. He will speak with our social worker to see what options are available given his insurance. He 
will do this prior to discharge. 
He denies SI ,rnd feels stable overall. He says he has a good support network in place and he is looking forward 
to getting discharged ar this time. 
Please see discharge summary for the discharge diagnoses. 
IMPRESSION: 
PSYCHIATRIC: 
0 Opioid clependence, severe. 
0 Amphetamine dependence, severe. 
o Benzodiazepine dependence, severe. 
0 THC dependence, se\'ere. 
0 DepressiYe disorder, not otherwise specified. 
MEDICAL: 
• Hepatitis C, status post Interferon . 
0 History of pleural effusion. 
0 Opioid withdrawal. 
STRESSORS: 
o Legal stressors. 
0 Poor psychosocial support. 
o Difficulty with finances. 
PLAN: 
0 Discharge home, please see above fix rationale. 
0 The patient will talk with social ,Yo1-kcr prior to discharge. 
I will give patient 7 tabs ol'trazoclonc co take with him (50 mg p.o. every bedtime p.r.n. insomnia). 
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PSYCHIATRTC EVALUATION 
center tlrnt will take his insurance and to do so as soon as possible. 
0 The patient denies SI and has never attempted. suicide. Although he has a lot of risk factors in place, he is 
not dctainablc al this ti1i1c and we will proceed with discharge. 
0 Again lhc paticm denies SI and agrees lo talk with staff and will use emergency services in lieu of 
harming himself'. 
Electronically signed by James Piktel, IVID 011 5/20/2015 
l(i:23 ::53 AM 
DD : 5/19/2015 15 :35 
DT: 5/19/20 I 5 17:24 
Job#.: 111767393 
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-~hi~0 bill creates a new class of crime un~er the Unif0rm controlled 
'·. subs,:tances Act, "Drug Trafficking," which impos·es mandator.Y minimum 
::;. •prison. terms and fines for those · convicted of dealing large· 
~ ,qua~tities of drugs. The bill targets drugs that creat~ seribus 
·:·_. problems in Idaho, enumerated as follows: marijuana, cocaine, 
;. •methamphe i:,amine, immediate precursors to methamphetamine ; and 
her:o·in · In order to come within the purview of this · crimina'i 
statute, an individual must possess a sufficient quantity of one .of 
the · specified drugs to indicate heavy invol veme.nt .in the drug 
trade•. Di fferent sentences are established for each substance, 
depending upon the nature of the drug and the problem that the 
substance poses for society. :Mandatory sentences cannot be reduced 
or suspended by the courts unless the defendant ele2ts to assist 
law enforcement in ide~tifying and prosecuting other drug dealers. 
, This bill is designed to increase the risk of doing business for 
th:is . targeted class of drug dealers by imposing strict mandqtory 
sentencing and by. increasing detection through cooperation . Large 
scale drug dealers ~ake an economic choice when dealing drugs. The 
risk of be i ng detected and the likely severity of the sentence are 
oftin outweighed ·by the huge untaxed profits generated by dealing 
drugs. Currently these triffickers may receive little punishment, 
es~ecially if f i rst~time offenders. This bill ensures uniformity, 
, certainty and .proportional severity. Further, drug dealers rarely 
, · agree to work with law enforcement to identi"fy sources of supply 
becat,se the risk of cooperation outweighs the· risk of being 
· sentenced severely. In this legislation the only means of reducing 
·one"s sentence is through cpoperation with law enforcement. 
This mandatory minimum bill is modeled after several other .states 
~hich have f6und it to be extremely helpful in curbing illicit drug 
traffic. 
FISCAL IMPACT . 
·The -fiscal impact of ·- this bill would be limited to the - in.creased 
prison costs for housing drug traffickers sentenced to the custody 
' .. of the · Department o f Corrections. An estimate of this impact is as 
' follows: 
1 . Number of targeted offenders incarcerated under this 
bill per year (165 offenders/5 years= 33 average) .• 33 
2 . Annual cost· of prison bed per inmate ....... $14,SBS 
Annual cost of le·gislation ... . . . ... . ...... . . . : $491,195 
EXHIBIT C 
,_.,_·. : S:TA_TEME;NT OF PURPOSE/ FISCAL NOTE H 7 Hl 
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This number is greater than the actual impact for the following ··; 
reasons: · .·.:i 
l._ Currently, many of th~ targeted class are currently ; / , 
being sent ·to prison for such offenses. Therefore th~ ·~ 
financial impact of this bill will be limited to those 
cases _not presently resulting in incarceratio~ . 
2. According to t.he experience of other states and the ___ : . 
Federal government, many of t ·he ta_rgeted class of dealers 
will opt to reduce their sentences by assisting law 
enforcement. 
Assuming that currently 50% of the targeted class of offenders are 
receiving sentences consistent with this bill, and assuming that 
25% of the targeted class will opt to aid law enforcement, the 
actual annual fiscal impact would be as follows: 
1. Number of additional targeted offenders incarcerated . 
under this .bill per year (33 '.~average x 50%) ....... 16. _5 ::~: .. _ 
1
,·,; <-< 
(Less those assisting law enforcement (33 x 25%) ... 8.25 __ :.-k~•j~ ."1 ,.'~;.;, .• f~-
Actual increase of incarcerated ·offenders .......... 8. 25 : ,, • '.:- · -' :. 
2. Annual cost of prison bed per inmate ........ $14, s·as ::< 
Annual cost of le'g islation ............... . ..... $122,801 .:,--., 
... ,·. 
This impact will be offset by two iactors. First, there would be .~ 
a reduction in drug-related crimes as the legislation impacts the~.,. 
illicit drug · rnarket . Second, the . successful use of informants wh_o .:· ' 
cooperate pursuant to this- legislation wauld substantially reduc~ 
investigative costs due to shorter investigations and the increase 
in forfeitures from ass.et-rich drug dealers. 
STATEMENT OF P,L.iRPQSE/FISCAL NOTE H 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSI 
RS 01377 
Due to the constraints of the · ·'legal systE 
of our counties to .collect £:j.ne revenues, . it i 
penalty to an inf~action.· 
. ·FISCAL IMPACT· 
None. 
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Filed: March 22. 2017 at 10:00 AM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: 'R~Wv' DeputyClcrk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




State of Idaho 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV01-17-05039 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich , the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, one copy of the: Petition for Post Conviction Relief as notice pursuant to 
Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties or attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
E-Mail: prosecutor@adaweb.net 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
E-Mail: public.defender@adacounty.id.gov 
John Charles Lynn 
Attorney at Law 
E-Mail: john@johnlynnlaw.com 
Dated: 3/22/2017 
@ Certificate of Mailing 
Christopher D. Rich 
Clerk of the District Court 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kendal McDevitt 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Suite 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 















Case No. CV 01-17-05039 
ANSWER TO PETITION 
COMES NOW, the State ofldaho, by and through Kendal McDevitt, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney and does answer the petition of Black's petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 19-4906(c). 
I. 
General Responses to Mark Black's Post-Conviction Allegations 




Specific Answers to Mark Black's Post-Conviction Allegations 
1. Answering paragraphs 1 through 8 of Mark Black's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 
Respondent admits the allegations contained therein. 
2. Answering paragraph 9, the state denies the conclusory allegations. 
3. Answering paragraph 10, as to subsection a, the state lacks sufficient information upon 
which to base an answer and so denies the claim, reserving the right to amend this answer upon 
further investigation. The state denies the allegation in subsection b, c and d. 
III. 
Respondent's Request for Judicial Notice 
The state requests the Court to take judicial notice of the court file and proceedings in 
Case No. CR-FE-2015-0013589. I.R.E. 201. 
First Affirmative Defense 
Black's claim is barred because it was waived in the trial proceedings. Idaho Code§ 19-
4908. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
To the extent Black's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims are 
procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code§ 19-490l(b). 
000077
Third Affirmative Defense 
Black's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations 
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code §§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That Black's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) That Black's claims for post-conviction be summarily dismissed; 
c) For such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary in the case. 
DATED this .2t>-rt-aayof ~ 2017. 
eputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~0 - day of Ayt-,\ 2017, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be placed in Odyssey email, addressed to: 
John C. Lynn 
500 W. Bannock St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
john@johnlynnlaw.com 
NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE P. 1
JOHN C. LYNN





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MARK BLACK, )
)
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV 01-17-05039
v. )
) NOTICE OF STATUS




COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, JOHN C. LYNN,
and hereby gives notice that the Court has set a status conference for the above matter for May
11, 2017 at 11:00 am in chambers.
DATED This 21st day of April, 2017.





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Jeri Heaton, Deputy Clerk
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NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE P. 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of April, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICOURT system, which sent a Notice of
Electronic Filing to the following to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney at:
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
DATED This 21st day of April, 2017.





SCHEDULING ORDER - 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






Case No. CV01-17-5039 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 




Based on discussions between the Court and counsel during a status conference held in 
chambers on May 11, 2017, IT IS ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Any motions for summary dismissal or summary adjudication shall be filed by June 
16, 2017; 
 
2. Responses to any such motions shall be filed by July 10, 2017; 
 
3. Replies to responses may be filed by July 24, 2017; 
 





      ________________________________  
      Jason D. Scott 
      DISTRICT JUDGE 
Signed: 5/11/2017 11:52 AM
Signed: 5/11/2017 01:15 PM
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II /_ 
FILED By: '"--::: ::.. Deputy Clerk 
Fourth Judicial Dist rict, Ada County 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cle rk 
 
SCHEDULING ORDER - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
 I hereby certify that on this ____ day of May, 2017, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
 
Office of the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney (  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(x) Electronic Mail 
(  ) Facsimile 
(  ) Interdepartmental Mail 
 
John C. Lynn 
500 W. Bannock St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
john@johnlynnlaw.com 
(  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(x) Electronic Mail 
(  ) Facsimile 
(  ) Interdepartmental Mail 
  
  
 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 




     Deputy Court Clerk 
 
11th





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
000083
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kendal McDevitt 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 




ST A TE OF IDAHO , 
Respondent. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV0 1 17 05039 
) 




) _____ _ ____ _ _____ ) 
COMES NOW, Kendal McDevitt, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, 
State of Idaho, and moves this Court for Summary Disposition of the above case. A Brief in 
Suppott of Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition is attached. 
DATED this ~day of June 2017. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: Ke~ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (BLACK) Page I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \ lo day of June 2017, I caused to be served, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ~ upon the individual(s) named below in 
the manner noted: 
Name and address: John C. Lynn, Attorney at Law 
□ By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid first class. 
□ By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
□ By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at 
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
"iJ Via Icourt efile & Serve 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (BLACK) Page 2 
Electronically Filed
6/16/2017 4:29:58 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kendal McDevitt 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Suite 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 














) ____ _ _ __________ ) 
Case No. CV0l-17-05039 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Kendal McDevitt, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney and does hereby provide this brief in suppo11 of the State's motion for 
summary disposition of Black's petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
4906(c). 
I. General Standards 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil , rather than criminal proceeding, 
governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. LC. § 19-490 I ; l.C. § 19-4907; State v. 
1 
Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion for Disposition 
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Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008). See also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 
720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like plaintiffs in other civil actions, the petitioner must 
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-
conviction relief is based. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition for post-
conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, in that it must 
contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 
135 (2008); Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271 , 61 P.3d at 628. 
The petition must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
petitioner, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, 
or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included. J.C . § 19-4903. In 
other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations or it wi ll be subject to dismissal. Wolfv. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 11 69, 
1172 (Ct. App. 201 I); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 90 I (Ct. App. 1994). 
Affidavits and attachments, however, are not pleadings. I.R.C.P. 7. It iS incumbent upon a 
party to object if the party believes a fact is not admissible. I.R.C.P. 56(2). Further, I.C. § 19-
490 I does not require that the Court suddenly consider every lega l argument or claim an 
applicant puts in his affidavit or puts in some document attached to his pleading, when that 
claim does not appear in the pleading itself. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition fo r post-conviction 
relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court' s own initiative, if " it appears 
from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of 
2 
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facts, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matte r of law. " I.C. § l 9-4906(c). When 
considering summary dismissal , the Court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's 
favor, but the Court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner' s conclusions of law. 
Payne, 146 Idaho at 561 , 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. 
Moreover, because the Court rather than a jury wil l be the trier of fact in the event of an 
evidentiary hearing, the Court is not constrained to draw inferences in the petitioner' s favor, 
but is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 4 483; Wolf, 152 Idaho at 67,266 P.3d at 11 72; Hayes v. State, 
146 Idaho 353,355 , 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by 
the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a 
prirnafacie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner' s allegations do not 
justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 52 1, 236 P.3d 1277, 128 1 (20 IO); 
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,570,225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 
603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 
(2007); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 51 8, 960 P.2d 738, 739 ( 1998); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 
360, 368, (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is 
appropriate when the Court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to 
relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner' s favor. For this reason, summary 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when the State does not 
3 
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controvert the petitioner's evidence. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 561 , 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 
Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. 
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a 
petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v. 
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone, 108 Idaho at 826, 702 
P.2d at 864. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which 
he bears the burden of proof, summary disposition is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 
592,861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Where petitioner's affidavits are based upon hearsay 
rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing is 
appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 844 P .2d 706 ( 1993). 
11. Trial Counsel's performance was not deficient 
Black asserts that trial Counsel's performance was deficient for not moving to dismiss the 
case based on the unconstitutionality of the trafficking statute. Petition, 1 9, p. 2 and 110, p. 5. 
However, the Idaho Appel late Courts have upheld the trafficking statutes on a variety of 
constitution issues. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that 
the attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 
693- 94 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To 
establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation 
4 
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fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 
P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 
2007). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 
114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 11 77; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 442, 163 P.3d at 231. 
Idaho 's appellate courts have long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic 
decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based 
on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172,254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011). "Because 
of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged 
conduct, there is a strong presumption that counsel's perforn1ance was within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy." Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 
406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 ( 1988). A petitioner must overcome a strong 
presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment" to establish that counsel's performance was 
"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 
1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
5 
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B. The Trafficking Statute has been held to be Constitutional 
19 years ago the Idaho Court of Appeals held that J. C. § 37-2732B was constitutional on 
three grounds. First, that it does not violate the separation of powers principle . Second, that it 
does not deny an individual due process of law. Third, that it does not violate the equal 
protection clause. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 966 P.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1998). I.C. § 37-
2732B has also been upheld on the basis that the discretion of a prosecutor to choose between 
two statutes which proscribe the same conduct but provide for different penalties, does not 
violate the United States Constitution. State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 617, 977 P.2d 228, 231 
(Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Black obtained a plea agreement that dismissed Count II 
Count II was a second count of trafficking with a mandatory minimum sentencing. Black 
benefited from having Count II dismissed in exchange for his guilty plea to Count I. Trial 
counsel would have run the risk of the State not resolving the case as it did had trial counsel filed 
a motion to dismiss the trafficking counts. Therefore, trial counsel's lack of fi ling a motion to 
dismiss appears tactical, rather than due to ignorance of the law. 
D. Dismissal of the Two Trafficking Counts would not have stopped the 
Prosecution of Black 
6 
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Even if the trial court had dismissed the trafficking charges pursuant to a motion, Black 
would still have faced prosecution for felony possession of cocaine in Count III of the 
Information. The State could have also have moved to amend the Information to include felony 
possession with intent to deliver of heroin and cocaine or filed them in a separate case. In any 
event, there was not a probability of the case being dismissed outright as Black claims had a 
motion to dismiss been filed. Petition, ~ 1 0.C, p. 6. 
III. Conclusion 
Therefore, the filing of a motion to dismiss would not have had a reasonable probability 
of achieving a different outcome than the one that occurred in this case. As such, trial counsel 
was not deficient and Black was not prejudiced by the lack of a motion to dismiss based on the 
unconstitutionality of I.C. § 37-2732B. Furthermore, Black's claims regarding the 
unconstitutionality of I.C. § 37-2732B are legal in nature and there is no genuine issue of 
material fact to be decided by the Court. 
WHEREFORE the Respondent requests that this court grant its Motion for Summary 
Disposition of the claims in Black's petition. 
DATED this /(;-/Lday ofJune, 2017. 
' 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County osec ting Attorney 
By: 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
7 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
l HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \\o day of ,~ \ ll ~ 2017, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be placed in Odyssey email, addressed to: 
John C. Lynn 
500 W. Bannock St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
john@johnlynnlaw.com 
Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion for Disposition 
8 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - 1
JOHN C. LYNN






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MARK BLACK, )
)
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV01-17-05039
v. )
) BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO




COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, JOHN C. LYNN,
and hereby files this BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION. The RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
(“MOTION”) is not well taken and unsupported by the record, for the reasons and argument set
forth below.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner has filed the Petition For Post-Conviction Relief (“PETITION”) in issue,
challenging the constitutionality of the fixed sentencing provisions under Idaho Code §37-
2732B, generally, as well as the specific provision supporting the underlying conviction herein,
Electronically Filed
7/10/2017 2:16:15 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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Idaho Code §37-2732(B)(a)(6)(B). These statutes are referred herein as the trafficking statutes.
The PETITION raises several claims relating to the constitutionality of these statutes (Id pp. 2-5,
paras 9a. through i.), and also alleges constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel for the
failure to raise these constitutional claims in the trial court proceedings (Id p. 5, para 10). The
claims in the PETITION are supported by the DECLARATIONS OF JOHN CASPER, MD
(“Casper Decl”), FAITH SAWYER, MS LPC (“Sawyer Decl”), MARK GORNIK (“Gornick
Decl”) and JOHN C. LYNN (“Lynn Decl”), as required by Idaho Code §19-4902,03). It is
presently undisputed that, when convicted, Petitioner suffered from a serious mental and
physical illness – addiction – and was by no means a trafficker of heroin. It is also undisputed
that there is no rational basis to conclude that mere possession of a threshold quantity of heroin
supports the presumption of drug trafficking. It is also undisputed that the statutes violate ‘due
process’ and ‘equal protection’ of the law as more fully explained below.
The Respondent has filed its MOTION on the basis that the Court can conclude, as a
matter of law, that Petitioner is not entitled to relief. However, because of the undisputed facts
now before the Court, this MOTION must be denied.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
The standards have been recited numerous times in many post-conviction cases heard and
resolved in Idaho appellate courts and Petitioner will not repeat that litany here, as Respondent
has set forth the relevant statutory provisions and caselaw in its BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (“BRIEF”) , pp. 1 – 4. Suffice it to state here:
Summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can
conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all
disputed facts construed in the petitioner's favor. For this reason, summary dismissal of a
post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when the State does not controvert the
petitioner's evidence. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 Idaho at
647, 873 P.2d at 901.
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Conversely, if the petition, affidavits and other evidence supporting the petition
allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction
claim may not be summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102
P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004).
(Moore v. State, 38591, Ct. App., 9/17/20; emphasis added)
Petitioner maintains that he has alleged facts that are true, and if left undisputed, would
entitle him to relief as a matter of law.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Petitioner concedes that, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, he must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced
by the deficiency. To establish prejudice, Petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but
for the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Here, Petitioner claims that trial counsel was deficient for failing to raise the
constitutionality of the trafficking statutes in issue. These principles beg the question: had trial
counsel raised the constitutionality issue, would the trial court (or appellate court) have found the
trafficking statutes unconstitutional?
Resolution of the constitutionality issue is then, by definition, resolution of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the
underlying criminal action, the court properly may consider the probability of success
of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity
constituted incompetent performance. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d
634, 637 (Ct.App.1993). Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a
motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial
court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test. Id. at 158-59, 857
P.2d at 637-38.
(Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 927 P.2d 910 (App. 1996))
(Ct. App. 1996), emphasis added)
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TRAFFICKING STATUTES
A. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT -
Respondent’s argument that the trafficking statutes in issue are constitutional is based
solely on two 1998 cases: State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 966 P. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1998) and
State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 977 P. 2d 228 (Ct. App. 1998). Much has changed in our society
and view of drug usage in this country since 1998. Petitioner’s expert, Mark Gornik, MS,
summarized this change as follows:
14. After four decades of soaring prison growth and stubbornly high recidivism rates,
the United States is rethinking its heavy reliance on incarceration. Individual states,
recognizing that the fiscal and human costs of widespread imprisonment largely outweigh
its public safety benefits, are leading this shift. Many state leaders are embracing a fresh
approach to corrections guided by data and anchored in evidence about what truly works
to change criminal behavior. Tough-on-crime rhetoric is being eclipsed by calls for a
more data-driven criminal justice system that delivers increased public safety at a lower
cost (see LIST OF AUTHORITIES #18 and #19). The Justice Reinvestment Initiative
(JRI) is a response to these calls and has been a strong catalyst for state reform. A public-
private partnership between the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and The Pew
Charitable Trusts (Pew), JRI was formally launched in 2010 to help states fully
understand their unique correctional trends and adopt policies and practices to better
manage their corrections populations (see the Justice Reinvestment Initiative State
Assessment Report ) released in January 2014 that summarizes what has happened in the
28 states that engaged in the JRI process between 2010 and 2016.
(Gornik Decl, p.11).
Moreover, courts are recognizing the failings of the mandatory minimum sentencing
rationale. For example, U.S. District Judge Gleason expressed the problem as follows:
This case illustrates how mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases distort the
sentencing process and mandate unjust sentences. In the substantial percentage of cases
in which they apply, they produce a sentencing regime that is worse than the one the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted to replace. They make opaque what that law
was intended to make transparent. They strip criminal defendants of the ‘due process’
rights we consider fundamental to our justice system. Most importantly, too many
nonviolent, low- sweep reasonable, innovative, and promising alternatives to
incarceration off the table at sentencing level, substance-abusing defendants like
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Jamel Dossie " lose their claim to a future" — to borrow a phrase from Attorney
General Eric H. Holder, Jr.— because lengthy mandatory prison terms.
(United States v. Dossie, 851 F.Supp.2d 478, 479 (2012);
emphasis added)
With respect to the Rogerson case, the quantity in issue was 400 grams of
methamphetamines and one pound of marijuana. The Rogerson Court did acknowledge the right
of the people, through the legislature, to amend the Idaho Constitution and provide for
mandatory minimum sentences without violating the separation of powers doctrine (Id p. 56).
However, it is time for Idaho courts to revisit this issue in light of the current rethinking of
mandatory sentences and the judiciary’s inherent power which transcends that of the legislature
on some subjects, sentencing in particular. It is time to revisit the principles stated in State v.
McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P. 2d 247 (1971), cited in Rogerson:
We conclude from these authorities that the judiciary possessed the power at common
law to suspend sentence. However, this does not, standing alone, nullify the statute under
consideration for it is clear that the common law can almost always be overturned or
modified by the legislature. I.C. § 73-116. If the common law was recognized as the law
of this state at the time the constitution was adopted, State ex rel. Rich v. Idaho Power
Co.,supra, we must also conclude that the powers reserved to the several departments, but
not enumerated, must be defined in the context of the common law.
Were we deliberating upon a matter of substantive law, there would be no doubt that the
legislature has effected a valid change in the common law. However, this is a
consideration of much greater dimension. The constitution provides that the judiciary
is a department separate from the others and that the '* * * legislature shall have no
power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly
pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government * * *'
But, this document does not explicitly delineate what those powers shall be. For this
reason we must go beyond the constitution itself to discover what were the powers
held peculiarly by the judiciary. In this light, we perceive that the authority
possessed by the courts to sentence necessarily includes the power to suspend the
whole or any part of that sentence in proper cases and this is more than a bare rule
of substantive law subject to change by the legislature. Rather, it is in the nature of
an inherent right of the judicial department and one which the separation of powers
concept in our system of government places above and beyond the rule of
mandatory action imposed by legislative fiat.
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(Id p. 240, emphasis added)
One point is worth mentioning here: it is easy to defer to the legislature, without giving much
thought to the judiciary’s inherent power in the context of mandatory minimum sentencing when
the amount of illegal drug is exceedingly high as was the case in Rogerson. Here, the amount
involved what was necessary to sustain Petitioner’s drug habit for a few days ( Casper Decl, p.
4).
The Rogerson case also addressed a ‘due process’ argument, but in a much more limited
context than what the Petitioner presents here. Rogerson argued that the trafficking statute
denied ‘due process’ because it eliminated the State’s burden to show intent to deliver and the
Court held that the “it is uniformly held that the power to define crime and fix punishment . . .
rests with the legislature and that the legislature has great latitude in the exercise of that power”
(Id p. 56). Nevertheless, even though the legislature’s power may have great latitude, it is not
unbounded. The Petition here raises a far more comprehensive approach, as discussed below,
on the question of whether the legislature has exceeded its power and violated ‘due process’.
The ‘equal protection’ argument addressed in Rogerson was likewise quite limited. The
Rogerson Court considered only two classes of drug offenders: one class prosecuted under the
trafficking statute and one class prosecuted under Idaho Code §37-2732 – Possession with Intent
to Deliver, etc. The distinction in sentencing between these two classes of convicted drug
offenders was upheld on a rational basis:
The legislature may rationally and legitimately determine that possession,
manufacture, or delivery of larger quantities of controlled substances creates
greater harm and a greater threat to society, and therefore warrants a sentence of
greater deterrent and punishment value, than does similar activity with a lesser
quantity of drugs. As we observed in State v. Ybarra, 122 Idaho 11, 15, 830 P.2d 522,
526 (Ct.App.1992), "tremendous waste, hurt, and tragedy" exist in our society as a result
of drug trafficking and drug abuse. The legislature's decision to increase the level of
punishment for crimes involving larger amounts of controlled substances is
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rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in curbing large-scale possession,
manufacturing, and distribution of controlled substances. Therefore, the statutes in
question do not violate the ‘equal protection’ Clause. (Id pp. 56, 57)
(Id pp. 56, 57, emphasis added)
As mentioned above, this is not a case involving “large-scale” drug possession. Consequently,
the rational basis existing in Rogerson disappears here. Moreover, the ‘equal protection’
arguments in this case are far more expansive that in Rogerson, as will be discussed below.
Also, the large scale drug quantity in Rogerson lent easy resolution to the ‘cruel and
unusual’ argument presented on those facts (Id p. 57, 58). The large quantity of drugs involved
(400 grams of methamphetamines and one pound of marijuana) were valued at $80,000 in 1998
dollars. Here, in contrast, 26 grams of heroin was sufficient to satisfy Petitioner’s habit for a few
days. Petitioner’s drug habit is addressed in more detail below.
With respect to the Payan case, the ‘equal protection’ argument presented was very
limited. The classes created by Idaho Code §37-2732B (mandatory minimum) and Idaho Code
§37-2732 were the only two in issue. Again, the Payan Court’s rationale in finding no ‘’equal
protection’ violation was partially based on the large quantity of illegal substance – marijuana.
Citing Rogerson, the Payan Court restated the principle that “The legislature’s decision to
increase the level of punishment for crimes involving larger amounts of controlled substances is
rationally related to the State’s interest in curbing large-scale possession, manufacturing,
and distribution of controlled substances” (Id, p. 618). This aspect of both Payan and
Rogerson is not present in the facts here.
Finally, Payan partially relied on U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) and State v.
LaBarge, 116 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1989) which, for purposes here, held that prosecutorial
discretion is not unfettered, as it is still subject to constitutional restraints: "The ‘equal
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protection’ clause prohibits selective enforcement “based upon an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” (Payan , p. 617). This is precisely the point – the
classifications, addressed more fully below, are arbitrary. The crimes in LaBarge were sexual
offenses, neither of which involved mandatory minimum sentencing that invades the sentencing
province of the judiciary by “tying the judge’s hands”. Petitioner agrees with the general
proposition that prosecutors have discretion to elect which alleged offense will be brought when
the same facts support multiple offenses. However, the following dicta from LaBarge is
pertinent here: “Where the facts legitimately invoke more than one statute, a prosecutor is
vested with a wide range of discretion . . .” (Id, p. 939). The point of this PETITION is to show
that the facts of this case do not legitimately invoke the mandatory sentencing goals of the
trafficking statutes and are arbitrary in violation of ‘due process’ and ‘equal protection’.
B. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS –
Having addressed and discussed the Respondent’s authority upon which it bases its
MOTION, Petitioner will now show how the claims before this Court in this case are not
controlled by Rogerson or Payan. The individual claims are set out in paragraph 9.
9 a. A fixed sentence of ten years based on a finding of guilt for the mere possession of
more than seven grams of heroin is arbitrary and without any rational basis to support the
inference that Petitioner was a drug trafficker, as contemplated by the STATEMENT OF
PURPOSE behind the statute. As set for the [sic] in the STATEMENT OF PURPOSE,
the statute was designed to target “high asset”, heavily involved drug traffickers (see
Exhibit C, Declaration of John C. Lynn). Petitioner suffered from a serious heroin
addiction problem, a mental and physical illness, at the time of his arrest. He had no
assets and demonstrated no violence toward the arresting officers. Thus, the statute
punishes a person for having a mental and physical illness in violation of ‘due process’ of
law under Art I Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and the 5th and 14th Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution.
This claim was not raised in Rogerson or Payan. This claim focuses on the idea that the
trafficking statute is aimed at the “high asset” drug dealer which Petitioner was clearly not. In
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fact, Petitioner had virtually no assets or income (PSI, p. 65) and was, for all intents and
purposes, a drug addict doing no more than sustaining his drug habit – he was using drugs to
keep from getting sick at the rate of four to five grams per day (Id, pp. 4 – 66). Petitioner had
been treated, over the past several years, for an array of mental illnesses and had recently lost his
grandfather to suicide (Id pp. 10 – 15). In the opinion of Dr. Casper, Petitioner was “ unable to
control use of drugs, and is compelled to pursue continued use of drugs with an equal or greater
vigor than a normal person pursues safety and survival, or other basic life necessities, despite the
severe adverse consequences resulting from drug use” (Casper Decl, para 14). Further Dr.
Casper has opined in this record that Petitioner “does not fit the profile of a high-asset drug
trafficker”, as contemplated by Idaho Code §37-2732B for the following reasons:
a. He did not possess high assets;
b. He was not apprehended in the process of exchanging drugs for cash;
c. Based on Mark Black’s severe addiction to heroin, the amount of heroin in his
possession at the time of arrest, 27 grams, would have met his personal consumption
requirement for no more than a few days.
d. It is very uncommon for a high-asset drug trafficker to be a drug addict, and
especially, an addict with the severe features of addiction manifested by Mark Black.
e. High-asset drug traffickers do not commonly resort to theft [etc.] in order
to support a drug addiction, as reflected in Mark Black’s presentence investigation.
(Id, para 17).
Petitioner’s other experts concur with Dr. Casper’s opinions (see Sawyer Decl, para 7 and
Gornik Decl, para 8 (f)). These facts are undisputed. Therefore, Petitioner alleges that the
application of the trafficking statutes to him was arbitrary and without a rational basis; on this
record, this Court must conclude so. It is this theme, that is, Petitioner was prosecuted and
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sentenced not for trafficking in drugs but for using drugs to satisfy and uncontrollable habit, that
runs through all the alleged claims herein.
9 b. The general Trafficking statute, Idaho Code §37-2732(B), punishes a person for
trafficking in illegal drugs, yet fails to require the State to prove any indicia of
trafficking, or selling of drugs for profit, such as possession with intent to deliver,
delivery itself or the manufacturing of illegal drugs. The statutes create a conclusive,
irrefutable presumption that mere possession itself constitutes the odious crime of drug
trafficking, and all that the term implies. Thus, the statute violates the ‘due process’ of
law provisions cited above.
This claim was not raised in Rogerson or Payan. Not only does the general trafficking
statute criminalize addiction, it elevates an addict’s simple possession of illegal drugs to the
crime of trafficking on the mere possession of specified quantities. The specified quantities are
irrational and arbitrary. The effect of the threshold quantities set forth in the general trafficking
statute is to create the presumption that possession of the threshold quantity alone suggests intent
to traffick or sell drugs. This is certainly not true in Petitioner’s case; there is nothing about the
circumstances of Petitioner’s arrest to suggest that he was a “high asset” drug trafficker. To the
contrary, the circumstances show a “low-asset” drug addict; all of Petitioner’s experts agree
with Dr. Casper’s opinion that “The inference that a certain threshold quantity of a drug can
determine possession for the purpose of sales versus possession for personal use is not supported
by research or by many hundreds of case studies of people on the streets that use” (Gornick Decl,
para 7.c.).
More succinctly: “At the time of his arrest, Mark’s tolerance to the physiological effects
of heroin resulted in an inability to go for more than 4-5 hours without going into sever
[sic] withdrawals (as evidenced by the police report dated 9/22/15 in the PSI Report dated
04/04/16) in which Mark reported injecting 2 grams of heroin prior to arrest and was
witnessed to have gone into withdrawals during the subsequent hours of police
detainment. With this level of tolerance, Mark’s possession of approximately 27 grams of
heroin would have lasted him at most 6-7 days of personal use. Without maintaining this
level of use Mark would have been unable to function in any reasonable capacity due to
withdrawals. This condition would have precluded any intent to sell/traffic heroin as no
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monetary reward would have been high enough to counterbalance his severe withdrawal
symptoms had he sold the heroin as opposed to using it to maintain his habit”.
(Sawyer Decl, p. 3)
These threshold quantities are arbitrary – they may have been valid in 1997, but
Petitioner is a case in point of the dramatic increase of possession and use of opioids arising over
the years to today’s epidemic. To treat him as a drug trafficker, without any indicia of intent to
sell and distribute in a large-scale capacity is a violation of ‘due process’.
9. c. The general Trafficking statute eliminates the requirement that there must exist a
union between an act and intent in order for the act to be a criminal offense, as required
by Idaho Code §18-114. The Petitioner’s addiction was at such a level that he had no
control over the possession and use of the addicted substance involved – heroin. Thus,
the statute violates the ‘due process’ of law provisions cited above.
This claim was not raised in Rogerson or Payan. Idaho Code §18-114 provides that “In
every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or
criminal negligence”. The general trafficking statute eliminates the element of intent and thus
violates this Code provision. Here, Petitioner’s addiction was so severe that he was
compelled to possess and use heroin “with an equal or greater vigor that a normal person
pursues safety and survival . . .” (Casper Decl, para 14). In short, Petitioner needed to use
drugs to survive (Sawyer Decl, p. 4).
"A person acts with intent when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or to cause the result." (Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986)). The
conduct in issue is trafficking in illegal drugs; although undefined beyond mere possession in
the statute, the Court can glean from the STATEMENT OF PURPOSE that the focus of the
statute was to sanction the business of large scale sales and distribution of illegal drugs (Lynn
Decl, Exhibit C). Petitioner was not in this business and had no intent to be in this business.
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9. d. The general Trafficking statute fails to define the term “trafficking” and fails to
require any level of purity, and in fact, allows the State to prosecute a person for
trafficking by the mere possession of “any detectable amount”. An addict, such as
Petitioner, could be prosecuted for having the requisite statutory amount of substance if
such substance contained a mere trace of heroin. It defies logic to infer that persons in
possession of this quantity of substance are drug traffickers, even assuming the term was
defined. Thus, again, the statute suffers from vagueness and irrationality in violation of
the ‘due process’ provisions cited above.
This claim was not raised in Rogerson or Payan. The starting point for the analysis of
this claim is the following:
Due process requires that all persons be informed as to what the state commands or
forbids and that persons of ordinary intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of
the law. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197, 969 P.2d at 246. No one may be required at the peril of
loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 261,
335 P.3d at 601. A void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and
a more stringent vagueness test will be applied where a statute imposes a criminal
penalty. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 198, 969 P.2d at 247. As a result, criminal statutes must
plainly and unmistakably provide fair notice of what is prohibited and what is
allowed in language persons of ordinary intelligence will understand. State v.
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486, 80 P.3d 1083, 1087 (2003). Additionally, a statute is
void for vagueness if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Freitas,
157 Idaho at 261, 335 P.3d at 601
(State v. Dean, 43201, January 27, 2016
(Ct. App. 2016; emphasis added)
The general trafficking statute does not define the term “trafficking” other than the
possession of threshold quantities of the illegal drug involved. For heroin, possession of two
grams constitutes trafficking in heroin without proof of any indicia of sales, delivery or
distribution. As argued above, these thresholds are arbitrary (Gornik Decl, para 7. e.). For
Petitioner, this is the equivalent of one dose for a four to five hour period (Sawyer Decl, p. 3).
Would the ordinary heroin addict understand that possession of two grams would render him or
her a drug trafficker?
Even more disturbing is the fact that possession of any detectable amount of heroin will
be sufficient to deem that person a trafficker (Idaho Code §37-2732B(a)(6). There is no
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difference between possession of heroin under Idaho Code §37-2732(c) and the possession of
heroin under the trafficking statute.1 Thus the two statutes, viewed together, do not give fair
notice of what is prohibited by the trafficking statute. Dr. Casper states the argument as follows:
Mandatory minimum sentencing pursuant to Idaho Code §37-2732B does not take into
account purity of heroin. For example a 2 gram sample of heroin that is 100% pure, and
an 8 gram specimen that is 25% pure both contain the same amount of heroin, yet the
penalty for possession of one sample is vastly different than the penalty of possession for
the other sample.
(Casper Decl, para 20)
The arbitrary threshold quantities set out in the general trafficking statute fail to consider
that a one gram weight of pure heroin is far more valuable than two grams of “cut” heroin and
far more indicative of actual trafficking. An ordinary person, including an ordinary drug user
would understand that the one gram of pure heroin is far more valuable than two grams of “cut”
heroin. Thus, this provision of the trafficking statute applicable to heroin violates ‘due process’;
it is so arbitrary and vague that it does not provide fair notice of the criminality it attempts to
proscribe. In other words, this circumstance created by the trafficking statute invites arbitrary
enforcement.
9. e. The general Trafficking statute creates different classes of drug traffickers without
any rational basis for treating these differing classes differently. For example, possession
of between seven and 28 grams of heroin results in a fixed ten year sentence. Possession
of the same amount of cocaine results in no fixed sentence (Idaho Code §37-
2732B(a)(2)(A)); likewise, possession of the same amount of methamphetamine results
in no fixed sentence (Idaho Code §37-2732B(a)(4)(A)). One must possess at least 28
grams of cocaine or methamphetamine to fall within any fixed sentence which would be
three years if the amount was less than 200 grams. A drug trafficker possessing more than
one pound but less than five pounds of marijuana would face a fixed sentence of just one
year (Idaho Code §37-2732B(a)(1)(A), and thus, the general Trafficking statute is
arbitrary and unfair in violation of equal protection under Art 1 Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution, and the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
1 The Rogerson Court did address the claim that these two statutes violated ‘ equal protection’.
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This claim was not raised in Rogerson or Payan. As mentioned above, the trafficking
statute fails to consider the purity of the illegal substance in terms of value and indicia of sales,
delivery and/or distribution (trafficking). Likewise, there is no rational basis to create different
quantities, and corresponding different penalties, for the various illegal drugs set forth in the
general trafficking statute. According to Dr. Casper:
The difference in severity of fixed sentences for possessing heroin, as compared to
harmful drugs of abuse such as cocaine or methamphetamine, as set forth in Idaho Code
§37-2732B suggests the presumption or conclusion that harm caused by heroin is vastly
greater. However, conclusive evidence to support this position does not exist. Although
heroin use may be associated with greater lethality to the user, on account of acute toxic
effects (leading to cardiopulmonary arrest), stimulant use (cocaine and
methamphetamine, is much more likely to be associated with violent harm perpetrated by
the drug user on persons or property. Therefore, there is no factual basis to support that
heroin causes more harm [sic] drugs of comparison, or to justify more severe penalties,
for possession of heroin.
. (Casper Decl, para 18)2
Faith Sawyer, MS LPC agrees with this irrational disparity:
To further the notion that the fixed sentencing statute for Heroin is irrational, arbitrary
and unjust, had Mark been convicted of trafficking in the equivalent grams (28) of
methamphetamine he would serve a fixed sentence of 3 years minimum. To receive a 10
year fixed sentence, he would have had to be in possession of 200 grams of
methamphetamine versus the same sentence for 7-28 grams of heroin. Of the two classes
of drugs, persons under the influence of methamphetamine/amphetamines (stimulants)
are more likely to commit violent offenses, behave aggressively, and experience drug
induced psychosis. In contrast, persons under the influence of heroin (sedative) are less
likely to commit violent offenses due to the drugs effect of sedation, an intense feeling of
calm and euphoria, and drowsiness.
(Sawyer Decl. p. 5)
Mark Gornick underscores the irrationality of the differing threshold quantizes set forth
in the general trafficking statute:
There is no valid reasoning or scientific proof that one drug is more dangerous than
another unless one specifically defines the meaning of dangerousness and harm. In
addition there are far too many variables associated with the degree of dangerousness or
2
Dr. Casper opines that there is a similar irrationality between the sentencing consequences for trafficking in heroin
and the illegal use of prescription opioid analgesic medications such as hydrocodone (Id, para 19).
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harm to the public to scientifically and consistently say one drug and quantity of that drug
are more harmful than another. Some but not all of the variables are; current public
opinion, availability of drugs vs. societal impact, disenfranchisement and cultural
disparity in sentencing, the typical behavior of users when high (e.g. a heroin addict is
fairly inactive stays home and enjoys “nod out” committing crimes only when in need of
a new supply whereas a meth addict will be active for days on end, often suffering from
sleep deprived psychosis, and commits crimes simply for the excitement or the sake of
it), high profile cases, media exposure, the character and personality of the user and the
effect the drug has individual to individual.
(Gornik Decl, para 12).
9. f. The general Trafficking statute, together with Idaho Code §37-3101, et seq, as they
apply to drug addicts, also creates two classes of persons. Those persons who are
prosecuted under the general Trafficking statute are treated as criminals and suffer
significant incarceration. Those addicts who voluntarily commit themselves to treatment
under the provisions of Idaho Code §37-3101, et seq, are treated as persons with mental
and physical illnesses, rather than as criminals, whose admissions as to drug use and
possession are protected from disclosure. The first class of persons receives no treatment;
however, the second class receives treatment for their addictions. There is no rational
basis justifying this distinction and disparate treatment of these two classes of persons,
and thus the general Trafficking statute is arbitrary and unfair, in violation of ‘equal
protection’ under the ‘equal protection’ provisions cited above.
This claim was not raised in Rogerson or Payan. It is unusual for the State of Idaho to
provide for treatment of criminal activity – Idaho code §37-3101, et seq, is unique in establishing
treatment for persons who engage in criminality to support their addiction. It is perhaps a
recognition that drug addiction is more of an illness or health issue than true criminal activity.
Nevertheless, this treatment statutory scheme creates two classifications of drug addicts – those
who are prosecuted under the general trafficking statute and those treated under Title 37.
Admissions of criminal activity disclosed to treatment professionals are confidential (Sawyer
Decl. pp. 6, 7). Had Petitioner carried the same illegal drugs into a treatment facility, sanctioned
by the State of Idaho, for the purpose of seeking treatment, he would not have been prosecuted.
This is classic violation of ‘equal protection’.
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9. g. The general Trafficking statute, together with Idaho Code §19-2524, as it applies to
drug addicts, also creates two classes of persons. Those persons who are prosecuted
under the Trafficking statute suffer significant incarceration without the evaluation and
treatment options available to the Court pursuant to Idaho Code §19-24233 and 2424.
Those addicts who are not prosecuted under the general Trafficking statute are treated as
persons with a substance abuse disorder and/or mental illness and are eligible for court-
ordered substance abuse treatment. The first class of persons receives no treatment;
however, the second class receives treatment for addiction and attendant mental
disorders. There is no rational basis justifying this distinction and disparate treatment of
these two classes of persons, and thus the statute is arbitrary and unfair in violation of
‘equal protection’ under the ‘equal protection’ provisions cited above.
This claim was not raised in Rogerson or Payan and is a corollary to 9. f. Again, the
general trafficking statute eliminates the ability of the sentencing court to consider mental illness,
as provided by Idaho Code §19-2523, 24, and appropriate treatment options. This creates two
classes of person without a rational basis.
9. h. The Trafficking statute in issue (Idaho Code §37-2732B(a)(6)(B), mandates a fixed
sentence which is disproportionate to the crime. A fixed ten year sentence for mere
possession of more than seven but less than 28 grams of heroin is grossly out of
proportion to the gravity of the act committed (addiction), in comparison to other
criminal sentencing laws in Idaho and throughout the United States. This
disproportionality shocks the public conscience in violation of the ‘cruel and unusual’
punishment clause of Art 1 Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution and the 8th Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
This claim was addressed in Rogerson and resolved as follows:
In this case, our threshold comparison of the crimes and the sentences does not lead to an
inference of gross disproportionality. Rogerson was found in possession of large
quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine. The prosecuting attorney estimated
that these drugs had a market value of $80,000. The amount of damage that could
be inflicted on human lives by the distribution and use of these drugs is incalculable.
The offenses are sufficiently serious that we cannot say that the sentences are out of
proportion to the gravity of the offenses or such as to shock the conscience of
reasonable people. Consequently, we do not proceed with a further proportionality
review. Rogerson has not demonstrated that his sentences, including the fines,
constitute ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment under either the federal or state
constitution.
( Id, p. 58; emphasis added)
3 There is a clerical error in the citation; it should be §19-2523 and 2524.
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The underlying facts of Petitioner’s conviction do not involve a large quantity of heroin
as discussed above. Simply put, Petitioner was not a trafficker of drugs in the sense of sales,
deliver or distribution for the purpose of attaining high assets. Petitioner was an addict with a
serious mental and physical illness. A fixed ten-year sentence is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime. Those who assault and attempt murder or commit manslaughter in Idaho
are exposed to less punishment (Idaho Code §18-4015; 4007). Those who actually commit
second degree murder are not exposed to a fixed sentence (Idaho Code §18-4004). Likewise,
there is less punishment exposure to sexual abusers of children (Idaho Code §18-1506). The
following dicta from U. S. v. Peterson, 143 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.Va. 2001) involving the
irrational sentencing distinction between crack and powder cocaine is particularly relevant here:
It is cruel, in any sense of the word, for society to impose a punishment that is not
rationally related to the offending conduct. And, fortunately, it is unusual in this country
that a penalty demonstrated to lack a rational foundation continues to be imposed for
years after an official agency charged with achieving fairness and proportionality in
sentencing has shown that the punishment is unjustified and the agencies charged with
enforcing the laws have concluded that the penalty does not achieve its intended purpose
and, indeed, frustrates that end. Thus, I would conclude that evolving standards of
decency dictate that a sentencing scheme must, at a bare minimum, have a rational
basis to survive scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment and that continued
application of the 100-to-1 quantity ratio violates the Eighth Amendment because it
is arbitrary and has no rational basis.
(Id, p. 588, 589; emphasis added).
To put the point and stated in a more blunt fashion:
From time to time they will inadvertently give a howitzer to the executive branch with
apparent authority to use it on a squirrel. That does not mean they want the executive
branch to use it in that manner. When that does happen and the result is someone
receives a penalty that is grossly disproportionate to the defendant's moral guilt, it is
the duty of the courts of this state to step in and apply the check granted by the
Eighth Amendment or article I, section 17.
(Paey v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D 3021, 943 So.2d 919, 934
(2 Dist. 2006); emphasis added)
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9. i. The general Trafficking statute in issue deprives the Court of its inherent power and
discretion in criminal cases where addiction, and its attendant physical and mental illness,
are excluded from consideration, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine under
Art 5 Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
This claim, as mentioned above, was not addressed in Rogerson or Payan. In 1978,
Article 5, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution was amended to provide for mandatory minimum
sentences which could not be reduced. Idaho Courts have ruled that the mandatory minimum
sentences under the general trafficking statute are legal (State v. Puetz, 129 Idaho 842, 934 P.2d
15 (Idaho 1997)). The constitutional amendment by the Idaho Legislature was done in response
to the holding in State v. McCoy (infra), 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (Idaho 1971):
Additionally, common sense tells us that this must be so. Our system of laws, indeed,
hopefully our civilization, has undergone a persevering evolution toward
enlightenment. A judge is more than just a finder of fact or an executioner of the
inexorable rule of law. Ideally, he is also the keeper of the conscience of the law. It is
for this reason that the courts are given discretion in sentencing, even in the most
serious felony cases, and the power to grant probation. We recognize that
rehabilitation, particularly of first offenders, should usually be the initial consideration in
the imposition of the criminal sanction. Whether this can be better accomplished through
the penal system or some other means, it can best be achieved by one fully advised of all
the facts particularly concerning the defendant in each case and not by a body far
removed from these considerations. Doubtless, legislation in the interest of the safety on
our highways is for a salutory purpose. This legitimate end cannot be met, in addition
to the other goals which must be sought within the law, by removing from the
purview of the trial court consideration of the merits of each offense and offender.
(Id, p. 241; emphasis added)
Petitioner raises the constitutionality of the fixed sentencing provisions of the general
trafficking statute here for the reason that Idaho courts have never ruled on the question as to
whether these laws might improperly invade the province of the courts – the inherent power of
the judiciary as articulated in McCoy. This inherent power over sentencing is “above and
beyond the rule of mandatory action imposed by legislative fiat” (Id p. 240). If this is the
case, then these fixed sentencing provisions must be unconstitutional. This is particularly so
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when a legislative fiat completely prevents the courts from considering addiction and the
attendant mental and physical illness associated with it.
THE STATE’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS
The State presents two alternative arguments in its BRIEF (pp. 6, 7) to the effect that if
the Trial Court had granted a motion to dismiss Count I on the basis of unconstitutionality,
Petitioner would have yet been exposed to prosecution under Count II and III. This may be so,
but the argument is beside the point.
The charge under Count II was trafficking in 28 grams or more of methamphetamine
which exposed the Petitioner to a fixed sentence of three years, pursuant Idaho Code §37-
2732B(a)(4)(A) – seven years less than the ten years fixed under Count I, upon which Petitioner
was convicted. The fixed sentencing provision relating to methamphetamine under the general
trafficking statute is just as unconstitutional as the fixed sentencing provisions relating to heroin.
Moreover, had the State amended the Information to include Felony Possession with the Intent to
Deliver Heroin and/or Cocaine, Petitioner would not have been exposed to a fixed sentence in
the event he was convicted.
The problem here is that Petitioner was sentenced to a lengthy fixed sentence under an
arbitrary, irrational and unconstitutional sentencing law for, essentially, being a drug addict.
Given the many charges that were brought, or could have been brought against Petitioner, this
prosecution illustrates that the State has far too much power to decide who gets charged and for
what offenses. This troubling byproduct of mandatory minimum sentencing was explained by
dissenting Judge Seals in Paey (infra):
As long as the conduct sought to be punished, banished, and deterred by mandatory
sentences is clearly defined and truly circumscribes only the intended evil and wicked
acts, the principle works comfortably within the limits of its logic. But when the language
is broad or vague, the law leaves room within that circumscription to include conduct
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manifestly not deserving of minimum mandatory prison sentences. The principle now has
the capacity to expand itself to and beyond its logical limits.
. . .
The downside is the potential for law enforcement and prosecutors to expand the
crime far beyond the limits of its logic and to use it irresponsibly, foolishly,
recklessly, or even vindictively. The result might well be convictions and sentences
that go beyond the bounds of decency, probity, and fair play--perhaps even into the
realm of ‘cruel and unusual’.
This is especially true when the statute describes trafficking by the mere knowing
possession of controlled substances that exceed certain weights. Not only does the
statute make knowing possession without anything else a severely punishable act, it
creates a conclusive, irrefutable presumption that the mere possession itself
constitutes the odious crime of drug trafficking and all that the term implies.
(Id, pp. 928, 929: emphasis added)
CONCLUSION
The determination as to whether the trafficking statutes are unconstitutional is fact-driven
and cannot be fully resolved as a matter of law. The state of the record currently is that these
statutory provisions are fundamentally flawed because they treat persons with addiction and
mental illness, such as Petitioner, as traffickers in illegal drugs when, in fact, they are sustaining
a habit. Moreover, these statutes are arbitrary and create classes of persons without a rational
basis. Finally, these statutes and their fixed, mandatory sentencing provisions constitute ‘cruel
and usual’ punishment and invade the inherent province of the courts.
This case typifies the problem identified in United States v. Dossie, infra “. . . too many
nonviolent, low-sweep reasonable, innovative, and promising alternatives to incarceration
off the table at sentencing level. . .” (Id, p. 478). For these reasons, the State’s MOTION
should be denied.
DATED This 10th day of July, 2017.
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Case No. CV 01-17-05039 
STATE'S REPLY TO BLACK'S 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
COMES OW, the State of Idaho, by and through Kendal McDevitt, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney and does hereby provide this reply to Black's response to the State's motion for 
summary disposition. 
I. Introduction 
Black's response is primarily focused on the constitutionality of LC. § 37-2732B. 
Response, p. 4- 19. However, there are three hurdles Black must get over before the Court even 
needs to address the constitutionality issue. First, Black must demonstrate how a guilty plea to 
State's Reply to Black's response to State's Motion for Summary Disposit ion 
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the trafficking charge and benefiting from the settlement agreement connected with the plea is 
not a waiver to later contesting its consti tutionali ty. Second, Black must demonstrate why his 
attorney was defic ient rather than making tactical choices. Third, Black must demonstrate that 
such a motion was likely to succeed and would have affected the outcome of the case. The Court 
does not have to consider the constitutionality of the statute should Black fail to clear all three of 
these substantial hurdles first . 
However, that won't be necessary as Black has not provided any evidence with his 
petition from either himself of his trial counsel regarding the absence of a motion to dismiss. 
Nor did Black provide any evidence with his petition that but for his trial counsel's failure to file 
a motion to dismiss he would not have pleaded guilty. 
Nor does the State believe that Black can do so as it would be contrary to the record 
established in his guilty plea. Black in writing admitted to the crime, stated that his plea was the 
result of a plea agreement, his plea was not conditional, that he waived legal defenses, that there 
was nothing he had requested his attorney to do that had not been done, and that there were no 
other motions or other requests for relief that he believed should be filed with the case. 
U. Argument 
A. Black's Guilty Plea Waived his Ability to Attack I.C. § 37-27328 
An applicant under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act waives any ground for 
rel ief when it is " .. . knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that 
resulted in the conviction or sentence ... " I.C. 19-4908. Black ' s eight page guilty plea and 
State' s Reply to Black's response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition 2 
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advisory form was filed with the Court on February 23, 2016, the same day the jury trial was to 
start. As a whole the form shows that Black knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived 
legal defenses he may have to the charge of trafficking that he now contests. See Attachment A. 
In particular the State notes: 
• 7. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or drugs, INCLUDING 
over the counter drugs, or drunk any alcoholic beverages? A: Yes. If "yes" what 
have you taken? A: Ibuprophen omeprazole. Do you believe thi s affects your 
ability to understand these questions, and make a reasoned and informed decisions 
in this case? A: No. 
• 8. ls there any other reason that you would be unable to make a reasoned and 
informed decision in this case? A: No. 
• 9. ls your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? A: Yes. If you answered 
"yes," what are the terms of that plea agreement? ... A: Defendant to pg to traff 
Heroin (>7 grams), 10 +5=15 state to dismiss remaining. Defendant free to argue. 
• 12. Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss your case with your 
attorney? A: Yes. 
• 14. Is there anything you have requested your attorney to do that your attorney 
has not done? A: No. 
• 17. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are reserving your right to 
appeal any pre-trial issues? A: No. 
• 21. Do you understand that by pleading gui lty you waive or give up any defenses, 
both factual and legal, that you believe you may have in this case? A: Yes. 
• 22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that you believe should still 
be filed in this case? A: No. 
• 40. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney can fo rce you to 
plead guilty in this case? A: Yes. 
• 41. Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily? A: Yes. 
• 42. Are you pleading guilty because you committed the acts alleged in the 
information or indictment? A: Yes. 
• 44. Has any person (including a law enforcement officer or police office or your 
attorney) threatened you or done anything to make you enter this pela against 
your will? A: No. 
• 45. Other that in the plea agreement, has any person promised you that you will 
receive any special sentence, reward , favorable treatment, or leniency with regard 
to the plea you are about to enter? A: No. 
• 47. Are you satisfied with your attorney? A: Yes. 
• 48. Have you answered all questions on this Questionnaire truthfully and of your 
own free will? A: yes. 
• 49. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions in this form which 
you could not work out by discussing the issue with your attorney? A: No. 
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• 51. Do you swear under penalty of perjury that yo ur answers to these questions 
are true and correct? A: Yes. 
B. Black has not Provided any Evidence that his Trial Counsel was Deficient 
Black argues that hi s trial counsel was deficient because his counsel did not attack the 
constitutionality of the trafficking statute as the statute is unconstitutional. Response, p. 3. This, 
however, is a circular argument that does not address the reasonableness of not filing the motion. 
Why does Black's trial counsel' s lack of filing a motion to dismiss in this instance fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness? See Brief in Support of Motion, p. 5. For 
instance, are similar motions routinely filed by other counsel representing their clients on 
trafficking charges in the Fourth District? The answer is that we don't know because Black did 
not provide any evidence with his petition to address this issue. 
C. A Motion to Dismiss Would not Likely have Succeeded In a Different 
Outcome 
Black argues that a motion to dismiss in his case would not have been affected by the 
precedent in Rogerson or Pavan as his arguments are different than those addressed in those 
decisions. Response, p. 8. This in itself does not establish that the motion to dismiss in this case 
would likely have succeeded or changed the outcome of the case. Black has not provided any 
evidence with his petition that similar motions have been granted in the same Court or by other 
District Court Judges in the Fourth District or in any District Court in Idaho for that matter. Nor 
has Black cited any Idaho appellate case law for dissents or dicta that would give an Idaho 
lawyer or District Court reason to believe the Appellate Courts invited or would favor such 
arguments. 
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1. Being Addicted to Drugs is not a Shield from Prosecution 
Black argues that the statute was arbitrarily applied to him because he is not a drug dealer 
but rather is an addict. Response, p. 8- 10. The statute however, does not create a distinction 
between those who have mental illness and those that do not. Black cannot show that he was 
treated differently because of his addiction. Also, mental illness is not a defense to a charge of 
criminal conduct. I.C. § 18-207. 
2. Threshold Quantities for Trafficking 
Black argues that the threshold levels within the trafficking statute are arbitrary as they 
are not supported by research and are vague. Response, p. 10- 11 and 13- 15. Under the same 
reasoning, the driving under the influence statues would also be unlawful as they have different 
punishments based on age, type of driver's license, and levels of concentration of alcohol in 
breath or blood, and also disregard addiction. More specifically, a prosecutor cannot charge an 
individual in an arbitrary manner under LC. § 37-2732B because the categories are determined 
by the weight of the substance which has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
or is the statute vague. Rather its puts the public on notice that " two (2) grams or more 
of heroin or any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer, thereof, or two (2) grams or more of any 
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of any such substance is guilty of a felony, 
which shall be known as "trafficking in heroin ... " J. C. § 37-2732B(a)(6) (Emphasis added). 
This makes it quite clear that the substance does not have to be 100% heroin and that if any 
amount is detected w ithin the substance a person can be charged under this statute. 
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Black also argues that it is irrational to treat heroin differently than methamphetamine 
with regards to the threshold weights. Response, p. 14. This argument ignores the difference in 
the classification of the two drugs. Heroin is a schedule I Controlled Substance. LC.§ 37-
2705( c )(11 ). A Schedule I controlled substance has both a high potential for abuse; and has no 
accepted medical use in the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under 
medical supervision. I.C. § 37-2704. Methamphetamine on the other hand is a Schedule II 
Controlled Substance. I.C. § 37-2707(d)(3). Schedule II controlled substances have high 
potential for abuse like heroin but are currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States, or currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions and the abuse of the substance 
may leave to psychic or physical dependence. LC. § 37-2706. Based on heroin and 
methamphetamine being in different schedules based on their differences there is a rational basis 
for treating the physical weights of the two drugs or substances that contain the drugs differently 
within I.C. § 37-2732B. 
3. I.C. § 37-2732B Does not Remove the Requirement of §18-114. 
Black argues that LC. § 37-2732B eliminates the requirement of a union between act and 
intent found in I.C. § 18-114. Response, p. 11- 13. The contrary is true. ICJI 406E shows that 
the State must prove a defendant knew the substance the defendant possessed was heroin, not 
merely, that a defendant possessed a substance that happens to be heroin. 
Under Black' s analysis, before a person could be found guilty for trafficking the State 
would have to prove the following: First, that a defendant possesses high assets. Second, that a 
defendant be apprehended in the process of exchanging drugs for cash. Third, that the substance 
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was not for personal use. Fourth, that the defendant not be addicted to controlled substances. 
And, fifth , that the defendant is not a thief. Response, p. 9. 
Black seeks to impose these requirements on the State in order to prove that the 
defendant is a drug dealer based on the statement of purpose for the statute. However, while 
statements of purpose are useful for statutory interpretation they do not impose elements that the 
State must prove. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 56, (Ct. App.1998) (It is for the legislature, 
not the defendant to decide what the elements of a crime should be). 
4. LC. § 37-3101Does not Bar Prosecution Rather it Protects Patient 
Information 
Black argues that I.C. § 37-3101 and LC.§ 37-2732B create two classifications of 
addicts. Response, p. 15. The Achilles heel with this argument is that J.C.§ 37-3101 does not bar 
prosecution under l.C. § 3 7-2732B or any other statute. Rather, LC. § 37-3101 simply prevents 
hospitals with a program that fits within the statute from releasing certain information to a law 
enforcement officer or agency. This is more akin to a privilege. Nor is a police officer, police 
agency, or a prosecutor's office involved in the placing of a person into treatment under J.C. § 
37-3101 versus arresting and charging them under J. C. § 37-2732B. 
5. LC.§ 37-2732B Does not Foreclose the Use of J.C.§§ 19-2523 and 19-
2524 
Black argues that I.C. § 37-2732B creates two classes of persons: one that benefits from 
I.C. §§ 19-2523 and 19-2524 and a second class that does not because of I.C. § 37-2732B. 
Response, p. 16. However, I.C. § 37-2732B does not bar the ordering of the evaluations found 
within I.C. §§ 19-2523 and 19-2524. And just because a person received a mandatory sentence 
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under I.C. § 37-2732B does not mean that they do not receive addiction treatment whi le 
incarcerated if warranted. In fact, there is no distinction in a defendant who is sentenced to 
prison under even LC. § 37-2732(c) versus I.C. § 37-2732B other than the length of 
incarceration. 
6. J.C. § 37-2732B Does not Impose Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Black argues that his sentence is disproportionate to his crime and violates his rights 
under the 8th Amendment and Art. 1 Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. Response, p. 16-17. A 
sentence is not cruel and unusual simply because it is mandatory. Harmel in v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (199 l )(mandatory li fe sentence for possessing 672 grams of cocaine 
did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause). Regarding proportionality, it is also 
important to note that the mandatory sentence in this case of ten years' incarceration is only three 
years more than a District Court can impose on a simple possession of heroin with no weight 
requirement under I.C. § 37-2732(c). 
Ultimately, further comment is unnecessary as the argument is barred in this proceeding 
as it is one that could have been raised on appeal. See l.C. §19-490l (b) and State v. Jensen, 138 
Idaho 941,946, 71 P.3d 1088, 1093 (Ct.App.2003) (A challenge to the length ofa sentence on 
cruel and unusual arguments could be raised for the first time on appeal). 
7. I.C. § 37-2732B does not Unconstitutionally Limit the District Court's 
Sentencing Discretion. 
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Black argues that the mandatory sentencing under LC.§ 37-2732B is unconstitutional as 
it invades the province of the court's inherent power in sentencing a defendant. Response, p. 
I 8- 19. Though conceding that I.C. § 37-2732B was upheld by State v. Puetz, Black argues 
that the Idaho courts have never ruled on the question as to the whether the trafficking statutes 
improperly invade the inherent province of the Courts. Response, p.18. This argument however, 
ignores a careful reading of Puetz as well as State v. Samora, 131 Idaho 198, 953 P.2d 638 (Ct. 
App. 1998). 
In reading, Puetz, the issue stated by Puetz was that whether the mandatory period of 
incarceration set forth in I.C. Section 37-2732B(a)(5) constitutes an improper limit upon the 
district court's discretion. Id . at 843. The State then restated the issue as whether the mandatory 
minimum fixed sentences prescribed by I.C. Section 37-2732B are permitted under art. V, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. lfL at 843. These issues are two sides of the same coin. 
The Idaho Supreme held that LC. Section 37-2732B, as amended in 1995, fully complied 
with art. V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and was therefore constitutional. Id. at 843. 
The following year, Samora like Black, claimed that the mandatory minimum sentence 
prescribed by l.C. § 37-2732B(a)( l ) imposed upon him v iolated Art. V, Section 13 of the ldaho 
Constitution, because it impem1issibly limited the district court's sentencing discretion. 
However. Somara had to concede that thi s argument was foreclosed by the ldaho Supreme 
Court's recent dec ision of State v. Puetz. 129 Idaho 842. 934 P.2d 15 (1997). ~ at 199. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held contrary to Black· s claim that the 
statute is unconstitutional in invading the province of the courts. 
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WHEREFORE the Respondent requests that this Court grant its Motion for Summary 
Disposition of the claims in Black's petition. 
DATED this J3v-) day of July, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this c:ltl: day of s~H ~ 2017, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the forego ing to be placed in Odyssey email, addressed to: 
John C. Lynn 
500 W. Bannock St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
john@johnlynnlaw.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FO~TH JUDICW., DISTRI~'EN ~F•~~----
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO FEB 2 l 2016 
GUIL1Y PLEA ADVISORY AND FORM (JUDGE JASON SCO'CERISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By sABRtNA STOKES 
. [)£PUTY 
TO BE FILLED OUT BY THE DEFENDANT 
Defendant's Name: /"I "I/. £/ 1&A . Signature~ 
Date: -z./1.1. I'' Case Number: 2,(11 r-1 ?rf? 
 
Nature of Charge(s): 
T ~ l tb-••"l i.,~ 
~ ") $1'.'"'2 
Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: 
lfJ-e, / 11rt 
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & ExPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA OF Gun.TY 
(PLEASE INmAL EACH RESPONSE) 
1. You have the right to remain silent You do not have to say anything about the 
crime( s) you are accused of committing. If you choose to have a trial, the State cannot 
require you to testify. If you do decide to testify, however, the State will be permitted 
to ask you questions on cross examination and anything you say can be used as · 
evidence against you in court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent before and 
during trial. t'\~ . · 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to the 
crime(s) in this case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse 
to answer any question or to provide any information that might tend to show you 
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide any 
information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s) to which you 
are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the right to 
remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to answering 
questions or providing information that may increase my sentence. Q"rl/3; . 




3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney and 
cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who ~ be paid by the 
county. I"~ 
4. You are presumed t.o be innocent You would be found guilty if: 1) you plead guilty 
in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right t.o be presumed innocent 
1"~ 
5. You have the right to a speedy and ·public jury trial. A jury trial is a cowt hearing to 
determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) brought against you. 
In a jury trial, you have the right to present evidence in your defense and to testify in 
your own defense. The state must convince each and every one of the jurors of your 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt · 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and public jury 
trial.~ . . . 
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses called against you. This occurs during a. 
jury trial where the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify under oath 
in front of you. the jury, and your attorney. Your attorney could then cross-examine 
( question) each witness. You could also call your own witnesses of your choosing to 
testify concerning your guilt or innocence. If you do not have the funds t.o bring those 
witnesses to court, the state will pay the cost of bringing your witnesses to court 
I understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving my right to confront the witnesses 
against me, to present witnesses on my own behalf and t.o present evidenc.c in my 
defense. ~ 
rr. The State has the burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
I understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving my right t.o require the State to 
prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 1'-~ 
QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA 
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question consult your 
attorney before answering.) 
PLEASE ClIEcK ONE 
l. Do you read and write the English language? 
If not, have you been provided witli an interpreter to 
help you fill out this form? YESb., 
NO□ 
NO□ 
2. What is your true and legal name? ~ ~'Qt-l'1 ~ \.~ 
. . ~ -
3. What was the highest grade you completed? '\k ~ 




If you did not complete high school, have you received either a GED or HSE? 
YES~ NO□ 
4. Are you currently under the care of a mental health professional? YES□ NO/ 
If you answered "yes," what is the mental health professional' s name? __ _ 
5. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health disorder? YES~ NO□ 
If you answered "yes," what was the diagnosis and when was it made? 
(,:A~' ~'6,S~~) t'\9N\C.. ~,~ }yfLJf, Po:;A: \t~"' S.1-rt.SS °'~w 
6. Aie you currently prescribed any medication? YES~ NO□ 
If you answered "yes," what medications are your taking at this time? 
ol'l~fh>'2D\~ It>~ (!w-plf, C,uf'iL) &r \«?hr:1-Bv-ttJ 
:CO."'ff°~ (;oo ~'-
If you answered ''yes," have you taken your prescription medication during the past 
24 hours? . YEo/ NO□ 
7. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or drugs, INCLUDING over the 
counter dr11-gs, or drunk any alcoholic beverages? 
YE~~ 
If ''yes," what have you taken? ...... J .... --.i~~i,l[t..:~~~.!!!-...JOw1i../V\l.:....s...&f1:..flo~k-...«.'>a:~:;..._---
Do you believe this affects your ability to understand these questions, and make a 
reasoned and informed decisions in th.is case? YES□ N °'f.. 
8. ls there any other reason that you would be unable to make a reasoned and informed 
decision in this· case? YES□ NO/ 
lf"yes,"wbatisthereason? _________________ _ 
9. ls your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? ~ NO□ 
If you answered "yes," what are the terms of tha1 plea agreement? (If available, a 
written plea agreement should be attached hereto as "Addendum 'A"') 
b h, Pt, h, i&n U-tAo,"v. () ) ,,,._..,.... ) \ / o,..r~ ,c 
Srh..Jc h o(,·,,..;cs ~,..;".~. b 4"', 1 b ""9i". 
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10. Th.ere are two types of plea agreements. Please initial the ONE paragraph below 
which describes the type of plea you are entering. DO NOT INITIAL BOTH 
PARAGRAPHS: 
a. I understand that the Court is NOT bound by the plea agreement or 
any sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence 
authorized by law, including the maximum sentence stated above. 
Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court 
chooses not to follow the agreement, I will not have the right to 
withdraw my guilty plea. ___ _ 
b. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement Th.is 
means that if the district court does not impose the specific sentence as 
recommended by both parties, I will be allowed to withdraw my plea 
of guilty pursuant to Rule 11 ( dX 4) of the Idaho Criminal Rules and 
proceed to a jury trial. __ _ 
11. As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading guilty to more than one crime? 
YES□ N°f 
If you answered "yes," do you understand that your sentence for each crime could be 
ordered to be served either concurrently (at the same time) dr consecutively (one after 
the other)? YE~ NO□ 
U. Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss your case with your attorney? 
YESf NO□ 
13. Have you told your attorney everything you know about the crime? ~ NO□ 
14. Is there anything you have requested your attorney to do that your attorney has not 
~ YES□ 7 
If you answered ~es," please explain. ____________ _ 
15. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor relating to your case. This 
may include police reports, witness statements, tape recordings, photographs, reports 
of scientific testing, etc. This is called discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence 
provided to your attorney during discovery? YES)( NO□ 
16. Are there any witnesses who could show you are innocent? YES□ NO_){ 
If you answered "yes," have you told your attorney who those witnesses are? 
. YES□ NO){. 




17. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are reserving your right to appeal any 
pre-trial issues? YES□ N~ 
If you answered "yes," what issue are you reserving the right to appeal? 
·'* 
18. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional guilty plea in this case you will 
not be able to challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea including: 
I) any searches or seizlll'es that occurred in your case, 
2) any issues concerning the method or manner of your arrest, and 
3) any issues about any statements you may have made to law enforcement? 
YE~ NO□ 
19. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment of conviction and sentence. as 
part of your plea agreement? YES□ No/ 
20. Have any other promises been made to you which have influenced your decision to 
plead guilty? YES□ NOr 
If you answered "yes," what are those promises? fl_ 
t,.,)_~ 
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you waive or give up any defenses, both 
factual and legal, that you believe you may have in this case? YES~ NO□ 
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that you believe should still be filed 
in this case? YES□ NO~ 
If you answered "yes," what motions or requests? ____ t---.... \-... /k ....... _____ _ 
23. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are admitting the truth of each 
and every allegation contained in•the charge(s) to which you plead guilty? 





If you answered "yes", do you understand that a plea of guilty in this case could be 
the basis of a violation of that probation or parole and additional p1mi sbment? 
YES□ NO□ 
Do you also understand that this sentence can be served consecutively to any 
other sentence you are currently serving? YE~ NO□ 
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25. As a result of your plea in this case, have you been advised that you may be required 
pay restitution to any victim in this case pursuant to I.C. §19-5304? 
~ NO□ 
If "yes", to whom? ----1~~~1-"C--'( ... ~CL..L,;~ ..... ,._____;l.....,A.,u.B~-----
26. As a result of your plea in this case, have you been advised that you ~y be required 
to pay restitution to any other party as a condition of your plea agreement? 
YE~ NO□ 
If"yes", to whom?--~--~....._...;:::_ __________ ~---
27. As a result of your plea in this case, will you be required to pay the costs of 
prosecution and investigation? (LC. § 37-2732(k)) YE~ NO□ 
28. As a result of your plea in this case, do you understand you will be required to submit 
a DNA sample to the state and pay for any testing of that sample? (LC. § 19-5506) 
YE~ NO□ 
29. As a result of your plea in this case, do you understand that the court can impose a 
fine for a crime of violence of up to $5,000. payable to the victim of the crime? (LC. 
§ 19-5307) YES□ NOf-
30. As a result of your plea in this case, is there a mandatory driver's icense 
suspension? YES□ N°f 
If "yes", for bow long must your license be suspended? __ . 
31. As a result of your plea in this case, is there a mandatory domestic violence, 
substance abuse, or psycbosexual evaluation? (I.C. §§ 18-918(7)(a),-8005(9),-8317) 
YE~ NO□ 
32. Have you discussed with your attorney the fact the Court will order a pre-sentence 
investigation, psycbosexual evaluation, anger evaluation and/or domestic violence 
evaluation and that anything you say during any of those examinations may be used 
against you in sentencing? YESp._ NO□ 
33. Has your attorney explained the fact that you have a constitutional right to remain 
silent during any of those exaroinatfons but that you may give up that right and 
voluntarily participate in those examinations? YE~ NO□ 
34. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to a felony, you run the risk that if you 
have new felony charges in the future, you could be charged as a Persistent Violator? 
(I.C. § 19-2514) ~ NO□ 




Do you understand that if you are convicted as a Persistent Violator, the court in that 
new case could sentence you to an enhanced sentence which could include life 
imprisonment? YES)C NO□ -
35. As a result of your plea in this case, will you be required to register as a sex offender? 
(I.C. § 18-8304) . . YES□ N°'f 
If you answered "yes" to this question, do you understand that if you are found guilty 
or plead guilty to another charge that requires you to register as a sex offender in the 
future, you could be charged in the new crime under I.C. § 19-2520G requiring a 
mandatory . sentence of :fifteen (15) years to run consecutive to any other sentence 
imposed by the court? YES□ NO, 
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, you will lose your right to vote 
in Idaho during the period of your sentence? (In. CONST. art. 6, § 3) 
~ NO□ 
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, you will lose your right to hold 
public office in Idaho during the period of your sentence? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) 
. YEo/-- NO□ 
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, you will lose your right to 
perform.jury service in Idaho during the period of your sentence? (ID. CONST. art. 6, 
§3) YE¥ NO□ 
39. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony you will lose your right to 
purchase, possess, _or carry firearms? (I.C. § 18-310) YE~ NO□ 
40. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney, can force you to plead guilty 
in th.is-case? . YESf NO□ 
41. Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily? YE¥ NO□ 
42. Are you pleading guilty because you committed the acts alleged in the in.formation or 
indictment? YE~ NO□ 
43. If you were provided with an interpreter to help you fill out this form, have you had 
any trouble understanding your ' interpreter? YES□ NO□ N~ 
44. Has any person (mcluding a law enforcement officer or police office or your 
attorney) threatened you or done anything to make you enter this plea against your 
will? YES□ NO)i. 
If your answer is ";~ what threats have been made and by whom? 
45. Other than in the plea agreement, has any person promised you that you will 
receive any special sentence, reward, favorable treatment, or leniency with regard to the 
~~~~to~ ~N~ 




If your answer is "yes," what proilllses and by whom? 
46. Do you understand that the only pe~on who can promise hat sentence you will 
actually receive is the Judge? YE~ NO□ 
Has the Judge made any promises to you? 
47. Are you satisfied with your attorney? 
YES□ NO~ 
YE~ NOci 
48. Have you answered all questions on this Questionnaire truthfully and of your own 
free will? YE~ NO□ 
49. Have you bad any trouble answering any of the questions in this form which you 
could not work out by discussing the issue with your attorney? YES□ N~ 
50. IF YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES. do you understand 
that by pleading guilty, or making factual admissions. this will trigger deportation or 
removal proceedings, meaning that you face being removed from the United States 
and returned to your country of origin, and losing your ability to obtain legal status in 
the United States, or denial of an application for United States citiz.ensbip? 
YES□ NO□ N~ 
Have yon and your attorney discnssed these issues? 
YESb-.. NO□ NAo 
51. Do you swear under penalty of perjury that your answers to ~uestions are 
true arid correct? S NO 
I have answered the questions on pages 1-8 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form truthfully. I 
understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each question and answer 
with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one 
has threatened me to do so. 
Dated this c;l") ~ day of n.~1 . 20",. 
~ 
I hereby acknowledge that I have discussed, in detail, the foregoing questions and answers 
Mfu7'11 Nl;A 
DEFENDANT'~ ATTORNEY 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MARK BLACK, )
)
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV 01-17-05039
v. )
) MOTION TO STRIKE




COMES NOW the above-named Petitioner, by and through his Attorney of Record,
JOHN C. LYNN, and hereby moves this Court for an order striking Argument II A. in the
STATE’S REPLY TO BLACK’S RESPONSE TO STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, for the reason that this argument, “Black’s Guilty Plea Waived his Ability to
Attack I.C. §37-2732B” was raised for the first time in reply. This is an inappropriate
argument:
A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented
because those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity
to respond in the respondent's brief. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122
(2005). Consequently, this Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in
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Motion to Strike P. 2
the appellant's reply brief. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95
P.3d 977, 990 (2004).
These principles apply to briefing practice on appeal, as well as to lower court motions.
Thus, the State’s introduction of a new argument in reply is unfair and prejudicial and should be
stricken from consideration by this Court.
DATED This 31st day of July, 2017.




I hereby certify that on this 31st day of July, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICOURT system, which sent a Notice of
Electronic Filing to the following to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
DATED This 31st day of July, 2017.





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF




     Petitioner,
  vs.  
State of Idaho
     Respondent.
Event Code: CMIN
JUDGE: Jason D. Scott DATE:
August 15, 
2017 TIME:      
CLERK: Sabrina Stokes COURTROOM: 509
REPORTER: Dianne Cromwell
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for Plaintiff(s): John Lynn
Counsel for Defendant(s): Kendal McDevitt
03:03:26 
PM  
MARK BLACK v ST OF IDAHO CV01-17-05039 SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL
03:03:58 
PM  Counsel: John Lynn/Kendal McDevitt
03:04:14 








Post hearing briefing on direct attack of constitutionality - will allow 
briefing. Want Mr. Black to present fully. Will allow Black to file post 
hearing briefing due by Sept 5 - waive or forfeit 37-2732b. Will further 
note possibility. 19-4901(b) . Mr. Lynn to address that issue on post 
hearing
03:31:16 
PM McDevitt Would like oppty to reply - 1 week su
03:31:53 
PM  
Post hearing reply brief to be filed by 9/12/17. Once submitted, will be 
considered under advisement and will issue decision shortly.
03:32:22 
PM  Motion to strike - is denied. 
03:33:00  End of Case
Filed: August 15, 2017  at      ,      .m.
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sabrina Stokes   Deputy Clerk
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IN TH DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MARK BLACK, )
) Case No. CV 01-17-05039
)
Petitioner, )
) RESPONSE TO STATE’S MOTION FOR
vs. ) SUMMARY DISMISSAL BASED ON
) “WAIVER”
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Defendant. )
COMES NOW, the above named-Petitioner, by and through his counsel of record, and
responds to the State’s MOTION TO FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (“MOTION”) based on
the argument that Petitioner has waived any constitutional challenge to the statute in issue.
INTRODUCTION
The State filed its MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION and supporting BRIEF to
this PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF (“PETITION”), on June 16, 2017.
Petitioner filed his BRIEF IN RESPONSE RO RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION on July 10, 2017. The State filed its STATE’S REPLY TO BLACK’S
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RESPONSE TO STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (“REPLY”) on July 23,
2017. In its REPLY, the State first raised an argument that Black’s Guilty Plea Waived his
Ability to Attack I.C. §37-2732B (REPLY pp. 2-4). Petitioner then filed his MOTION TO
STRIKE on July 31, 2017, claiming that the State improperly raised the “waiver” argument in its
REPLY, and thus foreclosed the opportunity for Petitioner to respond. The matter came on for
hearing before this Court August 23, 2017, whereupon the Court granted additional time for
Petitioner to respond to the “waiver” argument.
THE WAIVER
The State bases its claim of “waiver” on an eight-page guilty plea form signed by
Petitioner and submitted to the Court at the time the plea of guilty was tendered – see Attachment
A to the State’s REPLY. Noteworthy in this form is the acknowledgement by Petitioner that he
understands “that by pleading guilty you waive or give up any defenses, both factual and legal,
that you believe you have in this case” (see question 21, emphasis added). The State maintains
that any ground for relief raised in a post-conviction proceeding is subject to summary dismissal
under Idaho Code §19-4908, if such ground was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived
(REPLY, p. 2).
In this case, the argument that the constitutionality of Idaho Code §37-2732B was
waived, pursuant to Idaho Code §19-4908, fails for the simple reason that Petitioner was never
informed or advised that this statute was subject to a constitutional challenge in the trial court
proceedings (see Declaration of Mark Black, filed herewith). By definition, “knowingly waive”
necessarily requires the person waiving to have been made aware of what he was waiving.
Nowhere in this form is the constitutionality of this statute even addressed. In fact, Petitioner
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claims in his PETITION that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
constitutionality of this statute.
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR
At the hearing on this State’s MOTION, the Court allowed additional time and requested
that Petitioner address the “waiver” issue in the context of both Idaho Code §§19-4908 and
4901(b). Idaho Code §19-4901(b) stands for the proposition that any error that could have been
raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction.
However, there is an important exception to this general rule:
Unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by
affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial
doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due
diligence, have been presented earlier. (Id).
Resolution of the “waiver” issue under either statutory provision is controlled by the
“fundamental error” rule. Some errors, usually constitutional in nature, cannot be waived
without an explicit acknowledgement of the specific constitutional issue waived. Essentially,
Petitioner contends that he cannot waive a fundamental error which occurred in the trial court
proceedings. “Fundamental error” has been defined in Idaho to mean an error “which so
profoundly distorts the process that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his
constitutional right to due process” (State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho, 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109,
111(1991). Obviously, if a defendant enters a guilty plea and unknowingly waives a valid
challenge to the constitutionality of the criminal statute to which he plead “fundamental error”
has occurred. The PETITION herein raises multiple claims of a denial of due process and equal
protection.
There is no dispute that the “fundamental error” rule applies when a defendant enters a
guilty plea. For example, Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898, 277 P. 3d 1050 (App. Ct. 2012)
000139
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addressed the waiver issue in the context of a claim on post-conviction that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress:
The district court notified Hoffman of its intent to summarily dismiss the claim on the
grounds that it was a conclusory allegation unsupported by a factual basis, was an issue
that could have been raised on direct appeal and was not " cognizable" in post-conviction
proceedings, and was waived because Hoffman did not raise this issue at the time he
entered his guilty plea. Following a response by Hoffman, the court summarily dismissed
the claim on the notified grounds. On appeal, the State concedes Hoffman could not have
raised this ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the stop or the search on direct
appeal and did not waive the claim by pleading guilty, and therefore, summary
dismissal on either ground was erroneous. . . .
Based upon this record, a motion to suppress may well have succeeded and altered the
outcome of Hoffman's case. Thus, there is a material issue of fact as to whether
Hoffman's counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file a motion to suppress,
and the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition.
(Id. at page 903, 905, emphasis added)
The “fundamental error” rule was recognized in a similar factual scenario now before this
Court in Minton v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40, (App. Ct. 2007), where the Minton
claimed on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert the constitutional
right to cross examination at trial. The claim was recognized rule, general, as follows:
The appellate courts of this state ordinarily will not address an issue that was not
preserved for appeal through an objection in the trial court. State v. Rozajewski, 130
Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). We may, however, consider
fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made at trial.
Fundamental error is: ". . . such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's
rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which
was essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to
waive” (citation omitted).
(Id, p. 661)
The Minton Court then addressed whether it was appropriate to resolve ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal and ruled that these claims are more appropriate for
post-conviction proceedings where adequate evidence to support such claims might be presented
(Id, p. 662). This precisely the case here where the Petitioner has presented in his PETITION the
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factual support underpinning his claims that the mandatory minimum sentence, in issue, is
unconstitutional.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2017.




I hereby certify that on this 5th day of September, 2017, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ICOURT system, which sent a Notice
of Electronic Filing to the following to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
DATED This 5th day of September, 2017.






Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk
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JOHNC.LYNN 
Attorney at Law 
500 W. Bannock St 




Attorney for Petitioner 
IN TH DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV 01-17-05039 
) 
) 






I, MARK BLACK, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am the above-named Petitioner and make this declaration based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. That I was convicted of Trafficking in heroin under Idaho Code §37-2732B, pursuant 
to a guilty plea, and now suffer the mandatory ten-year fixed sentence imposed from this 
conviction which is the focus of these post-conviction proceedings. 
Declaration of Mark Black P. 1 
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3. During the trial court proceedings, I was never advised, by my court-appointed 
attorney, the Court or anyone else, that Idaho Code §37-2732B was subject to a constitutional 
challenge. 
4. Had I been advised that Idaho Code §37-2732B was subject to a constitutional 
challenge, I would not have plead guilty and waived such a challenge, for there would have been 
no strategic value in doing so. 
I, Mark Black, hereby declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of 
Idaho that the forgoing is true and correct. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ '2aay of~ 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing 
document with the Clerk of the Court using the !COURT system, which sent a Notice of 
Electronic Filing to the following to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney at: 
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
G-1;,_ S"~ 
DATED This __ day o~st, 2017. 
Declaration of Mark Black P. 2 
Isl John C. Lynn 
JOHNC.LYNN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Electronically Filed
9/12/2017 8:43 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kendal McDevitt 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 5273 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
















Case No. CV0l-17-05039 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW, Kendal McDevitt, Ada County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for 
the County of Ada and hereby gives this reply to petitioner's response to respondent 's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal. 
Black' s waiver of a constitutional violation by pleading guilty is a different issue than 
whether trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to dismiss based on a constitutional 
claim. 
Black argues that his guilty plea did not waive his ability to contest the constitutionality 
of I.C. § 37-2732B as it amounted to fundamental error in that he didn't know he was waiving 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL (BLACK), Page 1 
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the ability to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Response, p. 3. However, it is not 
sufficient for a petitioner to merely assert "fundamental error" as a fundamental error a llegation 
does not overcome procedural default under I.C. §19-490l (b). Hedger v. State 124 Idaho, 49, 
51-52, 855 P.2d 886, 888-889 (Ct. App. 1993); See also Henderson v. State, 123 Idaho 138, 844 
P.2d 1388 (Ct. App. 1992) (Procedural default applies even if the petitioner did not file an appeal 
from the underlying conviction). 
To be granted post-conviction relief on an issue which could have been raised on direct 
appeal, but was not, a petitioner must show, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by 
affidavit, deposition, or otherwise, that "the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt 
about the reliabili ty of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have 
been presented earlier." Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 702, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056 (Ct. App. 2015) 
In State v. Mauro, Response, p. 3., the Idaho Supreme Court held that since the minimum 
constitutional requirements contained in I.C.R. 11 ( c) were met, the trial court's fai lure to advise 
Mauro of the provision in I.C.R. 11 ( d)(2) was not fundamental error. ~ at 181. Here it was not 
fundamental error to not have advised Black that he was waiving a laundry list of any and all 
possible defenses that might be raised, known, as well as unknown to Black, as such is not 
required by I.C.R. l l(c). Black also cites Hoffman v. State in support of his argument. 
Response, p. 3. However, Hoffman does not discuss the "fundamental error" rule and the claim 
that the State conceded in that case that could not have been raised on appeal was not a 
constitutional claim but rather was a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 903. 
Likewise, Mintun v. State can also be factually distinguished. Response, p. 4. In Mintun, 
the issue was whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising fundamental error issues 
on appeal, not whether there was a waiver or not of constitutional defenses by the defendant's 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL (BLACK), Page 2 
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guilty plea. Furthermore, the Mintun decision has been distinguished by subsequent case law. In 
Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 703, 365 P .3d 1050 (Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals held: 
Mintun did not hold, even tangentially, that an unpreserved trial error itself can be raised in 
a post-conviction proceeding. Id. Thus, Mintun does not preclude the district court's 
conclusion that the issue of prosecutorial misconduct is waived. Because Bias presented no 
evidence as to why the issue could not have been presented on direct appeal, Bias has 
waived the issue. The di strict court properly dismissed the prosecutorial misconduct claim. 
Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 703, 365 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Ct. App.2015) 
As in Bias, Black has not established through evidence that either a fundamental error 
occurred or that the issue of the constitutionality of LC. § 37-2732B could not have been 
presented on direct appeal. Therefore, the Court would be proper in granting the State's Motion 
for Summary Disposition. 
DA TED this ~f September 20 I 7 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
1/}lf/ 
By: 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL (BLACK), Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ \_9" __ day of September 20 17, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the following: John Lynn, Attorney at Law by the following 
method: 
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States mai l, postage prepaid, first class. 
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were avai lable for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: 
~ Via !court efi le & serve 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL (BLACK), Page 4 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 








Case No. CV01-17-5039 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL  
 
In this post-conviction case, Petitioner Mark Black contends, first, that his conviction for 
heroin trafficking in the underlying criminal case is invalid because the statute under which he 
was charged is unconstitutional and, second, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to seek the trafficking charge’s dismissal on that basis.  Respondent State of Idaho 
moves for the petition’s summary dismissal.  The State’s motion was argued on August 15, 2017, 
and taken under advisement upon completion of post-hearing briefing on September 12, 2017.  




In the underlying criminal case (Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2015-13589), Black 
pleaded guilty, in return for dismissal of all other charges, to trafficking in heroin in violation of 
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6)(B).  That statute required the trial court to sentence Black to at least ten 
years of fixed prison time.  In compliance with it, on April 8, 2016, the trial court imposed an 
aggregate fifteen-year sentence, with ten years fixed.  A judgment of conviction was entered a 
few days later, on April 11, 2016.  Black didn’t appeal. 
Signed: 9/14/2017 11:01 AM
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 2 
He did, however, retain new counsel, replacing the public defender, to pursue a motion 
under I.C.R. 33(c) to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B) is 
unconstitutional.  The Court denied that motion on jurisdictional grounds, as it wasn’t filed until 
after the time for appeal had expired.  Black also filed a motion under I.C.R. 35(b) for a reduced 
sentence.  That motion was timely, but it was denied on the merits.  
On March 21, 2017, Black filed a petition for post-conviction relief.  His frontline claim 
is that section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B) is unconstitutional, on any of nine different theories.  (Pet ¶ 9.)  
It also includes a second claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
challenge section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B)’s constitutionality.  (Pet. ¶ 10.)   
On June 16, 2017, the State moved for summary dismissal, arguing that Black’s trial 
counsel didn’t render ineffective assistance because section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B) isn’t actually 
unconstitutional.  That argument, on its face, was directed only to Black’s claim for ineffective 
assistance, though it obviously has implications for his frontline claim as well.  On reply, the 
State more clearly challenged the frontline claim, arguing that, by pleading guilty, Black waived 
his right to challenge section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B)’s constitutionality.  Black responded by moving 
to strike this new argument, having been made for the first time on reply. 
Both the State’s motion for summary dismissal and Black’s motion to strike were argued 
on August 15, 2017.  During the hearing, the Court ordered post-hearing briefing regarding 
Black’s frontline claim that section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B) is unconstitutional.  Specifically, the 
Court required the parties to brief not only whether that claim fails for the reason the State 
advanced on reply—that Black’s guilty plea effected a waiver of constitutional challenges to 
section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B)—but also whether that claim fails for the related reason that Black 
failed to raise any such challenges in an appeal from the conviction. 
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The opportunity to submit post-hearing briefing negated any prejudice to Black arising 
from the State’s asserting on reply a new argument challenging his frontline claim.  The Court 
therefore denied Black’s motion to strike.  As already noted, the post-hearing briefing was 
completed on September 12, 2017, at which point the State’s motion for summary dismissal was 




A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding—not a criminal one—that 
is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  I.C. § 19–4907; State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 
437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008); see also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 
646 (2008).  Like plaintiffs in other civil actions, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of 
evidence the allegations necessary to support an award of the requested relief.  Stuart v. State, 
118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 
626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002).  A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an 
ordinary civil action, though, in that it must contain more than “a short and plain statement of the 
claim” satisfying I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 
(2008); Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628.  Instead, as to facts within the petitioner’s 
personal knowledge, the petition must be verified and accompanied by affidavits, records, or 
other evidence supporting its allegations, or it must state why it isn’t.  I.C. § 19-4903.  A petition 
is subject to dismissal if it doesn’t contain, or isn’t accompanied by, admissible supporting 
evidence.  Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Roman v. State, 
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A petition may be summarily dismissed, either on a party’s motion or on the trial court’s 
own motion, if “it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
I.C. § 19–4906(c).  When considering summary dismissal, the trial court must construe disputed 
facts in the petitioner’s favor, but it need not accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law.  Payne, 
146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. 
Summary dismissal is proper if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproved by the 
record of the underlying criminal case, if the petitioner hasn’t presented evidence making a 
prima facie case as to each essential element of the petitioner’s claims, or if the petitioner’s 
allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to justify relief.  Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 
236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010); 
DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 
(1998); Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145, 139 P.3d 741, 747 (Ct. App. 2006); Cootz v. State, 
129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Conversely, if the petition and accompanying materials contain admissible evidence of 
facts entitling the petitioner to relief, summary dismissal is impermissible.  Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Berg, 131 Idaho at 519, 960 P.2d at 740; Stuart 
v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 934, 801 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1990); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 
190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008); Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. 
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A. Black’s claim that section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B) is unconstitutional 
Black’s frontline claim is that his conviction is invalid because the statute under which he 
was convicted, section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B), is unconstitutional.  (Pet. ¶ 9.)  That issue could’ve 
been raised on appeal.  E.g., State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 55-58, 966 P.2d 53, 55-58 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (defendant appealed trafficking conviction, arguing that section 37-2732B denies 
procedural due process and equal protection, violates separation-of-powers principles, and 
imposes cruel and unusual punishment).  “[A] petition for post-conviction relief is not a 
substitute for an appeal.”  Grove v. State, 161 Idaho 840, 850, 392 P.3d 18, 28 (Ct. App. 2017).  
Indeed, “[a] claim or issue that . . . could have been raised on appeal may not be considered in 
post-conviction proceedings.”  Id.  That is the general rule set forth by I.C. § 19-4901(b). 
Section 19-4901(b) then provides an exception, which applies only when “it appears to 
the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that 
the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt 
and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.”  I.C. § 19-4901(b) 
(emphasis added).  Even assuming arguendo that Black’s showing raises a substantial doubt 
about the reliability of the finding of guilt, he identifies no reason the constitutional challenges 
he raises now couldn’t have been raised in timely fashion, in the trial court or on appeal or both.  
Indeed, he expressly claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failure to raise 
them in front of the trial court.  (Pet. ¶ 10.)  Thus, section 19-4901(b)’s general rule applies, not 
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This doesn’t mean that a post-conviction case can never present an occasion to explore 
section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B)’s constitutionality.  To the contrary, because “the proper way for a 
defendant to challenge an unpreserved trial error is to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
in a post-conviction proceeding” Grove, 161 Idaho at 851, 392 P.3d at 29, that issue potentially 
can be explored in adjudicating Black’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to challenge its constitutionality.  The Court now turns to that claim. 
B. Black’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
To prevail on his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
move for dismissal based on section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B)’s alleged constitutionality, Black must 
satisfy the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), 
and applied in numerous Idaho appellate decisions.  The first prong requires proving that trial 
counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.  E.g., Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 717, 390 P.3d 439, 443 (2017).  Trial 
counsel is, however, strongly presumed to have performed competently and diligently.  E.g., id.  
For that reason, trial counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions don’t amount to deficient 
performance unless shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review.  E.g., id.  “Ultimately, ‘the 
standard for evaluating attorney performance is objective reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 
(1999)).  If deficient performance is proved, the second prong of the Strickland test requires 
proving that the deficiency was prejudicial.  E.g., id. 
When the alleged ineffective assistance lies in trial counsel’s failure to file a motion, as is 
the case here, the first step is to assess whether the motion would’ve succeeded.  E.g., id.  If not, 
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then trial counsel’s failure to file it was neither deficient performance on his part nor prejudicial 
to his client.  See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 160 Idaho 586, 593, 377 P.3d 400, 407 (2016).  But if 
it would’ve succeeded, then trial counsel’s failure to file it was prejudicial to his client, yet not 
necessarily deficient performance on his part.  Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 718, 390 P.3d at 444.  
Proving deficient performance still entails overcoming the presumption that not filing the motion 
“‘was within the wide range of permissible discretion and trial strategy.’”  Id. (quoting Estrada v. 
State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006)).  Given the strong presumption that trial 
counsel performed competently and diligently, not filing a motion isn’t deficient performance if 
not filing it was “reasonable given the prevailing legal standards at the time of the trial.”  Id. 
Putting aside for a moment whether a motion to dismiss the trafficking charge on grounds 
of section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B)’s alleged unconstitutionality would’ve succeeded, the Court takes 
note of the dearth of evidence that, at the time of trial, it was a prevailing practice among defense 
attorneys to challenge section 37-2732B on constitutional grounds.  The Court has presided over 
numerous trafficking cases during the past several years, without ever seeing any such challenge 
(except in support of Black’s own attempt, long after sentencing, to withdraw his guilty plea).  
Moreover, a review of Idaho appellate opinions issued during the last several years suggests that 
such challenges are rare at best.  For good reason, such challenges are rare nowadays:  a series of 
opinions issued during the late 1990s rejected a variety of them.  State v. Pena-Reyes, 131 Idaho 
656, 656–57, 962 P.2d 1040, 1040–41 (1998); State v. Puetz, 129 Idaho 842, 844, 934 P.2d 15, 
17 (1997); State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 616-18, 977 P.2d 228, 230-32 (Ct. App. 1998); 
Rogerson, 132 Idaho at 55-58, 966 P.2d at 55-58.  Some of Black’s nine challenges (see Pet. ¶ 9) 
are highly similar to the already-rejected challenges, and some are different.  But none is truly 
individual to Black.  All of them could’ve been advanced by any number of similarly situated 
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defendants.  Yet there is no evidence that similarly situated defendants were pursuing these sorts 
of challenges during the last few years before Black entered his guilty plea.  As such, there is no 
genuine dispute about the fact that it was reasonable, under the prevailing legal standards at the 
operative time, for trial counsel not to pursue these challenges.  For that reason, Black is unable 
to prove that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, even assuming arguendo that one of 
these challenges might have succeeded. 
Consequently, Black’s nine challenges to section 37-2732B(a)(6)(B)’s constitutionality 
need not be analyzed on the merits.  That said, the Court will observe that none of them strike the 
Court as at all likely to have succeeded.  Although the Court doesn’t disagree with Black that 
section 37-2732B punishes some defendants too harshly, it doesn’t appear to be constitutionally 
infirm, at least not on any of Black’s theories. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion for summary dismissal is granted. 
 
       
Jason D. Scott 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Signed: 9/14/2017 10:36 AM
000155
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on September ____, 2017, I served a copy of this document as follows: 
Ada County Prosecutor (  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(  ) Electronic Mail 
(  ) Facsimile 
 
John C. Lynn 
Attorney at Law 
500 W. Bannock St 
Boise, ID 83702 
john@johnlynnlaw.com 
(  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(  ) Electronic Mail 
(  ) Facsimile 
 
  
      CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 




      By: _________________________________ 
      Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 








Case No. CV01-17-5039 
JUDGMENT  
 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Petitioner Mark Black’s petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed with prejudice.  
No relief is awarded to him. 
 
       
Jason D. Scott 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Signed: 9/14/2017 10:36 AM
Signed: 9/14/2017 11:02 AM
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cle rk 
 
JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on September ____, 2017, I served a copy of this document as follows: 
Ada County Prosecutor (  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(  ) Electronic Mail 
(  ) Facsimile 
 
John C. Lynn 
Attorney at Law 
500 W. Bannock St 
Boise, ID 83702 
john@johnlynnlaw.com 
(  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(  ) Electronic Mail 
(  ) Facsimile 
 
  
      CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 




      By: _________________________________ 
      Deputy Court Clerk 
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Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
NO. FILED~ 
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OCT O 2 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AUSTIN LOWE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 




THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent 
) (1---503°} 
) Ada County Case No. CV-01-~ 
) 
) 




TO: The State of Idaho, the above-named Respondent and its attorneys, the Ada County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office and the Attorney General of the State ofldaho: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Mark Black, appeals against the above-named 
Respondent from the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL ("ORDER"), entered in the above-entitled action on September 14, 
2017, the Hon. Jason D. Scott presiding. A copy of said ORDER is attached hereto. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the ORDER described 
in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
Notice of Appeal P. 1 
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3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the District Court erred in 
ruling that (1) Appellant's constitutional claim was waived because it could have been raised in 
the trial court proceedings or on direct appeal and (2) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to raise the constitutional challenge. 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record below has been sealed. 
5. Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript: 
(a). Oral argument on the State's motion for summary disposition held on August 
15, 2017 (Diane Cromwell, reporter). 
6. In addition to the standard clerk's record, pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R., Appellant 
requests the following: 
(a) Declaration of John Casper; 
. (b) Declaration of Faith Sawyer; 
( c) Declaration of Mark Gornik; 
(d) Declaration of John C. Lynn; 
( e) Declaration of Mark Black. 
7. I certify: 
(a) A copy of this Notice of Appeal is being served on the court reporter 
identified in paragraph 5(a) above; 
(b) Arrangements have been made for payment of the estimated fees for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript and for the preparation of the record. 
(c) There is no appellate filing fee as this is an appeal in a post-conviction case 
(I.A.R. 23(a)(10); 
Notice of Appeal P. 2 
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" ' 
( d) Service is being made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20, I.AR. 
DATED this V day of October, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this _.1L day of October, 2017, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Court Reporter 
Mr. Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
Notice of Appeal P. 3 
. ynn 
ey for Petitioner Ap 
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FILED By: __ ..4J.!!lu,..~ile:l.-DeputyClerk 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
Signed: 9/14/2017 11 :02 AM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV0l-17-5039 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Petitioner Mark Black's petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed with prejudice. 
No relief is awarded to him. 
JUDGMENT- I 
~ /:J. .&c.Jt Signed: 9/14/201710:36 AM 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on September ___!i_, 2017, I served a copy of this document as follows: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
John C. Lynn 
Attorney at Law 
500 W. Bannock St 
Boise, ID 83702 
john@johnlynnlaw.com 
JUDGMENT-2 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
(✓/Electronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
(~ Electronic Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Signed: 9/14/201711:0ZAM 
By: __ ¼~--=-uc'"~OEc=• '----"'f/4M~-----=c...._-
Deputy Court Clerk 
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500 W. Bannock St. 




· Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
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OCT 1 2 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AUSTIN LOWE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 















Case No. CV-01-2017-5039 
NOTICE OF REQUEST FOR 
AVAILABILITY OF PSI TO 
APPELLATE COURTS 
TO: THE ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLERK'S OFFICE: 
\ 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Petitioner-Appellant, by and through his counsel of .. 
record, John C. Lynn, pursuant to I.C.R. 32(h)(5) and I.A.R. 3l(b) and hereby requests that the 
Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI") prepared in Case No. CR FE 2015-13589, and 
previously released to Counsel Lynn, be made available· for review by the Appellate Courts in 
this appeal. This PSI is relevant to the issues in this appeal and was referenced in the a9ove-
, . 
' 
captioned post-conviction proceeding case from which this appeal arises. 
Request for Availability of PSI to the Appellate Courts P. 1 
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DATED this __Jl..day of October, 2017. 
C.LYNN 
Attorney for Petitioner Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1Z.... day of October, 2017, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the attached document to be served, by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Mr. Stephen W. Kenyon· 
Clerk of the Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
Request for Availability of PSI to the Appellate Courts P. 2 
o C. Lynn 
orney for Petitioner Appellant 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 45432 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 24th day of November, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
000167
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 




STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 45432 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRJSTOPHER D. RJCH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
JOHNC.LYNN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: 
NO\/ 2 4 2017 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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STATE OF IDAHO~ 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 45432 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
2nd day of October, 2017. 
/ 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
